Looking into a Crystal Ball: Courts\u27 Inevitable Refusal to Enforce Parties\u27 Contracts to Expand Judicial Review of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards by Chafetz, Eric
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 2
12-1-2008
Looking into a Crystal Ball: Courts' Inevitable
Refusal to Enforce Parties' Contracts to Expand
Judicial Review of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards
Eric Chafetz
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Dispute Resolution and
Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons,
Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Litigation
Commons, Other Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric Chafetz, Looking into a Crystal Ball: Courts' Inevitable Refusal to Enforce Parties' Contracts to Expand Judicial Review of Non-Domestic
Arbitral Awards, 9 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. Iss. 1 (2008)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol9/iss1/2
[Vol. 9: 1, 2008]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
Looking Into a Crystal Ball: Courts'
Inevitable Refusal to Enforce Parties'
Contracts to Expand Judicial Review
of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards
Eric Chafetz
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Arbitration is a type of alternate dispute resolution. Instead of litigating
a dispute in a court of law or equity before a judge, parties agree to submit
their dispute for adjudication before one or more arbitrators. Two distinct
statutory frameworks govern the arbitration of domestic disputes and non-
domestic disputes. First, Article (Art.) 12 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the
FAA)3 governs domestic disputes. Second, Art. 2 of the FAA4 and The
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award (NY Convention) 5 govern non-domestic disputes.6
1. The author, Eric Chafetz, is a 2004 graduate of Brooklyn Law School and currently an
associate with Togut, Segal & Segal in New York, New York. He would like to thank Professor
Claire Kelly of Brooklyn Law School for her insights, feedback, and assistance throughout the entire
writing process. Additionally, he would like to thank his wife Soraya Chafetz for her endless
support and inspiration in all aspects of his life.
2. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2008) [hereinafter FAA]. Hereinafter, Art. 1 of
the Federal Arbitration Act is also referred to as Chapter (Ch.) 1 and Art. 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act is referred to as Ch. 2.
3. The FAA is also known as the United States Arbitration Act. See Am. Postal Workers
Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Service, 823 F.2d 466, 469 (1 th Cir. 1987).
4. FAA § 201 . This section requires that The United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award be enforced in accordance with Ch. 2 of the FAA.
5. Art. 1, section 1 of the NY Convention, in pertinent part, mandates that the NY
Convention:
[S]hall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory
of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall
also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought.
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Without court intervention, an arbitration award is not enforceable and
does not have the same binding effect as a court's judgment.7 A party
involved in an arbitration governed by the NY Convention can move for an
award to be enforced in any signatory nation's court.8 For example, if a
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter NY
Convention] (emphasis added).
6. The term "domestic" is not defined in Art. I of the NY Convention. To fill that void,
various circuit courts have concluded 9 U.S.C. section 202 (discussed infra at note 16) defines
awards "not considered as domestic" for purposes of the NY Convention. Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v.
Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 706-07 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 735 (2005)
[hereinafter Jacada II]; Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1440-41 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim &
Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1997); Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 689 (7th
Cir. 1995); Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 933 (2d Cir. 1983); Ledee v. Ceramiche
Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1982). The Sixth Circuit in Jacada made the following
observation about the scope of 9 U.S.C. section 202:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract,
or agreement described in section 2 of this title ["any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce"], falls under the Convention. An
agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens
of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that
relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement
abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For
purposes of this section a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated
or has its principal place of business in the United States.
Jacada 11, 401 F.3d at 706 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 202 in brackets) (emphasis omitted).
Moreover, arbitration awards for purposes of the NY Convention have been classified as non-
domestic in only two instances. First, federal courts have held that an arbitration award is non-
domestic if one or more parties is not a United States citizen. Second, an award is considered non-
domestic if it is between United States citizens, but has a reasonable relation with a foreign state.
See Jacada II, 401 F.3d at 706-07; Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at 1440-41; Yusuf 126 F.3d at 19; Jain,
51 F.3d at 689; Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933; Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-87.
7. Section 207 of Art. 2 of the FAA governs the confirmation of an arbitrator's award under
the NY Convention. It states: "Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the
Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under
this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration." FAA §
207. Section 207 continues: "[T]he court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds
for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention."
FAA § 207 (emphasis added). The "specified grounds" of review are found in Art. V of the NY
Convention. See infra note 9. The material/operative terms in this section have a virtually identical
meaning as those in section 9 of Art. I of the FAA. See infra Part IV. A.
8. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 22:
The [New York] Convention succeeded and replaced the Convention on the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards ("Geneva Convention"), Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301. The
primary defect of the Geneva Convention was that it required an award first to be
recognized in the rendering state before it could be enforced abroad, see Geneva
Convention arts. 1(d), 4(2), 92 L.N.T.S. at 305, 306, the so-called requirement of "double
exequatur." This requirement "was an unnecessary time-consuming hurdle, and greatly
2
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Nigerian party and a Swedish party participate in an arbitration in the United
States, either party can move for the award to be enforced in Sweden,
Nigeria, the U.S., or in any other signatory state.
In this context, court intervention can come in two forms. First, a
victorious party can move for the confirmation of an arbitration award.
Second, the losing party can challenge the validity of an arbitration award by
moving to vacate it under certain narrow grounds of review enumerated in
Art. V of the NY Convention. 9 The scope of these grounds of review and
whether parties can contract to expand them are central to this article.
limited [the Geneva Convention's] utility". . .The [New York] Convention eliminated this
problem by eradicating the requirement that a court in the rendering state recognize an
award before it could be taken and enforced abroad.
Id. at 22 (citations omitted). See also ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 266-67 (1981).
9. Art. V of the NY Convention is central to the topic of this Article. Art. V states:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only ifthat party furnishes to the competent authority where
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) the parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or
(c) the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
(d) the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country; or
(b) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.
NY Convention art. V (emphasis added).
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Unlike under Art. I of the FAA,' ° courts have not addressed whether
parties can contract to expand l the judicial review provisions in the NY
Convention. 12 When courts do address this issue, they will initially rely
upon courts' prior resolution of two issues: (1) whether parties can rely on
the vacatur provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA in a
vacatur proceeding under the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA; and (2)
whether parties can rely on manifest disregard of the law and other grounds
of review implied under Art. I of the FAA in a vacatur proceeding brought
pursuant to the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA (collectively, these
two issues are referred to as the Expansion Issues).
All courts addressing the Expansion Issues have resolved them in the
negative (hereinafter, the Consensus). Significantly, they have concluded
that only the provisions enumerated in Art. V 13 can be relied upon in a
10. Sections 10 and 11 of Art. I of the FAA contain the grounds of review applicable to a
vacatur proceeding under Art. I of the FAA. Section 10 of Art. I of the FAA reads in pertinent part:
§ 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration-
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3)
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
§ 11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a
matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
FAA §§ 10-11.
11. This article will also briefly touch upon instances where judicial review is reduced or
entirely eliminated under the NY Convention.
12. FAA §§ 10-11. This includes parties contracting to expand the NY Convention's judicial
review provisions to include the grounds of review set forth in sections 10 and II of Art. I of the
FAA, and those implied under it, including, but not limited to, manifest disregard of the law.
13. See NY Convention Art. V, supra note 9.
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vacatur proceeding brought pursuant to the NY Convention. ' 4 Accordingly,
it is a virtual impossibility that courts will allow parties to contract to expand
Art. V of the NY Convention's judicial review provisions.
Although this conclusion is inevitable, it is misguided for various
reasons, including the improper resolution of the Expansion Issues. When
courts address whether parties can contract to expand the judicial review
provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention,' 5 they will rely upon section 202
of Art. 2 of the FAA,16 which reiterates and reinforces section 2 of Art. 1 of
the FAA. 17  Both sections include one of the most important purposes
underlying Congress's adoption of Art. 1 and Art. 2 of the FAA - enforcing
parties' arbitration agreements according to their terms, like any other
contracts.
Moreover, courts will rely upon section 207 of Art. 2 of the FAA' 8 and
section 9 of Ch. 1 of the FAA,' 9 each of which includes language
emphasizing the narrow nature of judicial review Congress envisioned under
Art. 1 of the FAA, the NY Convention, and Art. 2 of the FAA. However,
due to the Consensus on the Expansion Issues, the virtually identical
14. To the contrary, as will be discussed in more detail, all courts addressing the vacatur
provisions in sections 10 and II of Art. I of the FAA have concluded that in addition to the
provisions enumerated in those sections, parties can also rely upon certain other implied grounds of
review.
15. See NY Convention Art. V, supra note 9.
16. Section 2 of Art. I of the FAA, reinforced by section 202 of Art. 2, states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
FAA § 2 (emphasis added).
17. See FAA § 2, supra note 16.
18. Section 207 of Art. 2 of the FAA states in pertinent part: "The court shall confirm the
award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the said Convention." FAA § 207 (emphasis added).
19. Section 9 of Ch. I of the FAA states in pertinent part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered
upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any
time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant
such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
sections 10 and 11 of this title.
FAA § 9 (emphasis added).
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meaning of these two sets of provisions will be ignored, or given less weight
than they should be.
The courts, addressing whether parties can contract to expand the
judicial review provisions under Art. V of the NY Convention, will also rely
upon Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,2 ° Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,21 and First Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.22 These decisions attempt to balance two of the
most important purposes underlying Art. I of the FAA and the NY
Convention: enforcing parties' agreements according to their terms-
referred to in both section 202 of Art. 2 of the FAA and section 2 of Art. I of
the FAA-and the efficiency 23 of arbitration as an institution compared to
what litigation was expected to provide.24 Courts addressing whether parties
can contract to expand the judicial review provisions in Art. V of the NY
Convention will rely upon how courts have balanced these two policies
when faced with parties' contracts to expand the judicial review provisions
in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA. However, due to the Consensus,
the two policies will most likely not be balanced properly.
Courts faced with this issue under the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the
FAA will additionally focus on decisions and commentators' writings
addressing and reaching conflicting conclusions about whether parties can
contract to expand the judicial review provisions in sections 10 and 11 of
Ch. 1 of the FAA. 5 However, despite these sources, courts' prior improper
20. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). See discussion infra Part
IV.E.ii.
21. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
See discussion infra Part IV.E.i.
22. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). See discussion infra Part
IV.E.ii.
23. For purposes of this article, the use of the term "efficiency" refers to the amount of time
for litigation (from beginning to end) as compared to an arbitration (from beginning to end ) takes
to complete. One of the benefits of arbitration is that it is supposed to be a more streamlined-shorter
from beginning to end-form of dispute resolution.
24. See, e.g., Eric Chafetz, The Propriety of Expanded Judicial Review Under the FAA:
Achieving a Balance Between Enforcing Parties' Agreements According to Their Terms and
Maintaining Arbitral Efficiency, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2006).
25. Whether parties in the federal courts can contract to expand the judicial review provisions
in sections 10 and II of Ch. I of the FAA is far from clear. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 3. There
is a pronounced circuit split on the issue, which the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) has neither addressed nor resolved. Id. Among other Supreme Court precedents, these courts
rely upon Byrd, Volt, and First Options in reaching their respective conclusions. Id. at 9-16.
Compare Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995) (allowing contractual
expansion), Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-226, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,1997), cert
denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998) (allowing contractual expansion), and Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser,
257 F.3d 287, 289-290 (3rd Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001) (allowing contractual expansion),
with Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 930 (10th Cir. 2001) (not allowing contractual expansion),
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resolution of the Expansion Issues will inevitably skew the analysis of
whether parties can contract to expand the judicial review provisions in Art.
V of the NY Convention toward not allowing such review.
This article will first discuss the legislative history of the NY
Convention in general and the history of its vacatur provisions in particular.
Second, it will summarize certain federal court decisions that address the
Expansion Issues and reach the Consensus.26 Third, it will argue that the
Expansion Issues were resolved incorrectly, because the courts addressing
them do not recognize how the operative/material language 27 in section 207
of Ch. 2 of the FAA 28 and section 9 of Ch. 129 of the FAA has a virtually
identical meaning, and therefore should have been construed and applied in
the same manner.30
Fourth, this article will discuss how the courts addressing the Expansion
Issues incompletely analyze the interaction between the provisions in the
NY Convention and in Ch. 1 of the FAA. 3' The provisions in Ch. 1 of the
FAA are applicable to actions governed by the NY Convention to the extent
that they do not "conflict" with the NY Convention's provisions. 32
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Serv. Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 540
U.S. 1098 (2004) (not allowing contractual expansion), and Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v.
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing in dicta contractual expansion is not
appropriate). There is also a substantial amount of commentary on the issue. See, e.g., Anthony J.
Longo, Agreeing to Disagree: A Balanced Solution to Whether Parties May Contract For Expanded Judicial
Review Beyond the FAA, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1005, 1030 (2003) (proposing a unique solution whereby a
rebutable... "Presumption in Favor of the Right to Contract for Expanded Judicial Review" is created); Karon
A. Sasser, Freedom to Contract for Erpanded Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REV.
337 (2001) (favoring expanded judicial review); William H. Knull, IlI & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on
International Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, II AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 531 (2000)
(discussing disadvantages of expanded judicial review and favoring arbitral appellate review); Chafetz, supra
note 24, at 3-5 (arguing that determining whether parties can contract to expand the judicial review
provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. I of the FAA depends on the balance of two policies
underlying Art. I of the FAA-(i) enforcing parties' agreements containing arbitration clauses
according to their terms like any other contracts and (ii) the efficiency arbitration compared to
litigation is supposed to provide).
26. See discussion infra Part Ill.
27. The terms "operative/material" are used throughout this article to refer to the important
terms in certain statutes. In order to emphasize the significance of this language, the
"operative/material" terms are italicized throughout.
28. See FAA § 207, supra note 7.
29. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
30. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
32. Section 208 of Art. 2 of the FAA concerns the relationship between Ch. I and Ch. 2 of the
FAA. It states: "Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the
7
Chafetz: Looking into a Crystal Ball: Courts' Inevitable Refusal to Enforc
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2008
Specifically, these courts do not define, or recognize the significance of, the
term "conflict." Fifth, this article will argue that the courts analyzing the
Expansion Issues fail to recognize how the NY Convention's vacatur
provisions have historically been narrowly construed.33
Sixth, many of those same courts ignore how all the operative/material
language in Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention is in the past tense.34 This
interpretation leads courts addressing the Expansion Issues to improperly
conclude that the vacatur provisions in Ch. 1 of the FAA, and those implied
under Ch. 1 of the FAA, can be applied to actions governed by the NY
Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA, in certain instances, through Art. V(1)(e)
of the NY Convention.35
Seventh, this article will contend that how courts have improperly
resolved the Expansion Issues-the Consensus-foreshadows how those
same courts will eventually resolve the issue of whether parties can contract
to expand the judicial review provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention.
Significantly, it will argue that Volt, First Options, and Byrd, among other
precedents courts rely upon when addressing whether parties can contract to
expand the judicial review provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Ch. I of the
FAA,36 are also applicable to whether parties can contract to expand the
judicial review provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention, but will be much
less persuasive.
This inevitable conclusion-that parties cannot contract to expand the
judicial review provisions in the NY Convention-is irrespective of how the
main purpose underlying both Art. 1 and Art. 2 of the FAA is enforcing
parties' agreements according to their terms and how the vacatur provisions
in both statutes are intended to be narrowly construed.37
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NY CONVENTION AND CH. 2 OF THE
FAA
The NY Convention was adopted as a treaty governing international
commercial arbitration on June 10, 1958, after an international commercial
arbitration conference. The U.S. was a participant in the conference at the
extent that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United
States." FAA § 208 (emphasis added).
33. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
34. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
35. See discussion infra Part W.E.
36. SeeFAA §§ 10-11,supra note 10.
37. See FAA § 2, supra note 16.
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United Nations, but failed to ratify the NY Convention until October 1968.38
The U.S. finally became a signatory to the NY Convention upon the
enactment of implementing legislation in 1970.'9
The NY Convention was adopted by Congress as a new Ch. 2 of the
U.S. Arbitration Act,4 ° title 9 U.S. Code sections 201 through 208.41 The
reason the NY Convention was adopted as a new Ch. 2 was explained during
a meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on February 9,
1970, by Richard D. Kearney of the Office of the Legal Advisor of the U.S.
Department of State.42 He stated, "[it was] basically to avoid the confusion
which might result from a series of minor changes in the different sections of
the [United States] Arbitration Act as between cases falling under the act in
its present form and cases falling under the Convention.,
43
The main purpose of the NY Convention was to facilitate international
commercial arbitration. With that purpose in mind, the Supreme Court in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 44 observed:
The goal of the [New York] Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American
adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of
commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by
which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the
signatory countries. 45
In other words:
The 1958 Convention's basic thrust was to liberalize procedures for enforcing foreign
arbitral awards: While the Geneva Convention placed the burden of proof on the party
seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and did not circumscribe the range of
38. See Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, § 1 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 692); see
SEN. REP. No. 91-702, at 1-2 (1970); H.R.REP. NO. 91-1181, at 3601-02 (1970).
39. See Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, § 1 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 692); see
SEN. REP. No. 91-702; H.R. REP. No. 91-1181.
40. See supra note 3.
41. See Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, § 1 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 692); see
SEN. REP. No. 91-702; H.R.REP. No. 91-1181.
42. Hearings on Sen. No. 3274 Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., app.
to SEN.REP. NO. 91-702, at 5 (1970) (statement of Richard D. Kearney, U.S. Department of State,
Office of the Legal Advisor) [hereinafter Kearney].
43. See Kearney, supra note 42, at 5.
44. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
45. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520, n.15 (1974) (emphasis added). See also
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 538 (1995); SEN. REP. No. 91-
702 at 3 (1970) ("[T]he provisions of [Senate Bill No.] 3274 will serve the best interests of
Americans doing business abroad by encouraging them to submit their commercial disputes to
impartial arbitration for awards which can be enforced in both U.S. and foreign courts.").
9
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available defenses to those enumerated in the convention, the 1958 Convention clearly
shifted the burden of proof to the pary defending against enforcement and limited his
defenses to seven set forth in Article V.
46
III. SELECT FEDERAL COURTS' ANALYSES OF THE EXPANSION ISSUES
Various federal circuit and district courts have addressed the Expansion
Issues. The first, whether the vacatur provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Ch.
1 of the FAA, to the extent they do not "conflict" with the vacatur provisions
in the NY Convention, apply to actions governed by the NY Convention.
The second, whether manifest disregard of the law or other non-statutory
grounds of review implied under sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA can
also be implied in actions governed by the NY Convention.
Section 20841 of Art. 2 of the FAA may conclusively resolve whether
the vacatur provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA apply to
actions governed by the NY Convention-the First Expansion Issue-
because the section clearly states that the provisions of Ch. 1 of the FAA
apply unless they are in "conflict" with the NY Convention's provisions.
However, various courts disregard section 208 in its entirety. 48 Those courts
also overlook how the term "conflict" is not defined in Ch. 2 of the FAA,
can have more than one meaning, and depending on its meaning, can
materially impact the resolution of the First Expansion Issue.
Other courts do first address section 208 of Art. 2 of the FAA before
analyzing the second Expansion Issue: whether manifest disregard of the law
or other grounds of vacatur implied under sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the
FAA can also be implied in actions governed by the NY Convention.
However, like those courts failing to address section 208, 49 these courts also
do not define or recognize the significance of the term "conflict."
46. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'lndustrie Du Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added); see also Contini, International Commercial
Arbitration, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 299 (1959).
47. See supra note 32.
48. See discussion infra Part IV.B. for a more detailed discussion of section 208 of Art. 2 of
the FAA.
49. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
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A. Courts Discussing in Dicta, Whether any Grounds of Review Outside of
Art. V of the NY Convention are Applicable to Vacatur Proceedings
Governed by the NY Convention
i. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De
L 'Industrie Du Papier - Second Circuit - (1974)
One of the first reported decisions to address the possibility that a
ground of review not enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention could still
apply to a dispute governed by the NY Convention, was Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L 'Industrie Du Papier. 50
Parsons involved both a U.S. corporation-Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co., Inc. (Parsons)-and an Egyptian corporation-Societe Generale De
L'Industrie Du Papier (Societe). 5' A non-domestic arbitral award52 was
rendered against Parsons after an arbitration before the International
Chamber of Commerce (the ICC). 53
Parsons argued before the U.S. District Court that the award at issue
should have been vacated for five reasons. Four were enumerated in the NY
Convention, and the fifth, manifest disregard of the law, was implied under
sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA.54 In addressing the grounds of
review applicable under the NY Convention, Judge Joseph Smith argued,
relying on 9 U.S.C. section 208," 5 that the provisions of Ch. 1 of the FAA (9
U.S.C. sections 1-14) apply to the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards
to the extent that they do not "conflict" with the NY Convention's
provisions.1
6
The Second Circuit then observed that section 207 of the NY
Convention states: "The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement specified in
50. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 977.
51. Id.at971.
52. See supra note 6 for a more detailed discussion of non-domestic arbitral awards.
53. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 971 (it is not clear from the opinion where the arbitration took place
or where the award was rendered).
54. Id. at 972-73.
55. See supra note 32.
56. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 972-73 (citation omitted) (the Second Circuit did not attempt to
define the term "conflict" or recognize its potential significance).
73
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the said Convention. 57  Pursuant to section 207, the Second Circuit
recognized "[b]oth the legislative history of Article V... and the statute
enacted to implement the United States' accession to the Convention are
strong authority for treating as exclusive the bases set forth in the
Convention for vacating an award. 58
Alternatively, however, the court also recognized how the Supreme
Court, and subsequently the Second Circuit, acknowledged an implied
defense to the enforcement of an arbitration award under Art. 1 of the FAA,
where the award at issue is in "manifest disregard of the law."'5 9
The court does not decide whether manifest disregard of the law applies
to actions under the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA, but observes,
"[f]or even assuming that the 'manifest disregard' defense applies under the
Convention, we would have no difficulty rejecting the appellant's contention
that such 'manifest disregard' is in evidence here."6°
B. Courts Concluding that at a Minimum Parties Seeking to Vacate an
Arbitration Award Must be Able to Rely on the Grounds of Review
Enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention
i. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Company, Ltd. - Second Circuit - (1975)
A year after the Parsons decision, the Second Circuit in Fotochrome,
Inc. v. Copal Co.,61 was confronted by a dispute between a U.S. corporation,
Fotochrome, Inc. (Fotochrome), and a Japanese corporation, Copal
Company, Ltd. (Copal). The underlying arbitration took place in Tokyo,
Japan under the auspices of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.62
During the course of the arbitration, Fotochrome filed for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter XI of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act.63
The arbitration tribunal concluded the arbitration could continue despite
Fotochrome's bankruptcy filing. 64  Thereafter, the tribunal rendered an
award in favor of Copal.65  Copal then filed the arbitral award with the
57. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 977 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 207).
58. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 977 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
59. Parsons, 508 F. 2d at 977.
60. Id.
61. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1975).
62. Id. at 514.
63. Id. at 515.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Tokyo District Court.6 6 Pursuant to Japan's Code of Civil Procedure, "the
award became a final and conclusive judgment settling the rights and
obligations of the parties in Japan.",67 In other words, the award could not be
set aside for any reason in Japan.
Copal next filed a proof of claim in Fotochrome's bankruptcy
proceeding.68 Subsequently, Fotochrome challenged the validity of Copal's
proof of claim before a special referee in the U.S. 69 The special referee
concluded that the Japanese arbitral award was not a final judgment in the
bankruptcy proceeding. 70 The U.S. District Court reversed the special
referee's determination and found it was a final judgment.7'
In reviewing the District Court's decision, the Second Circuit first
observed that there are limited defenses against the enforcement of an
arbitration award under both Ch. 1 of the FAA and Ch. 2 of the FAA and the
NY Convention.72 In other words, enforcement of an award may be refused
"only on proof of specified conditions" under both statutory schemes.73
Additionally, Art. III of the NY Convention requires that "each contracting
state shall enforce arbitral awards in accordance with the rules of procedure
of the territory where the award is relied upon.
74
The Second Circuit concluded that a losing party may object to
confirmation of an arbitration award in an action governed by the NY
Convention on limited procedural grounds and the Japanese arbitral rule
disallowing all review is not enforceable in the Second Circuit.75
66. Id.
67. Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 515.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 518 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
13
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C. Courts Concluding that Parties can Only Rely on the Vacatur Provisions
Enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention, but not Addressing Art.
V(1)(e) of the NY Convention
i. M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co. - Sixth Circuit - (1996)
In 1996, the Sixth Circuit in M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co.
was confronted by an arbitration award rendered after an arbitration in
London, England.7 6 The arbitration was between a German corporation,
Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG (Behr), and a U.S. corporation, M & C
Corporation (M & C). 77 Pursuant to the terms of the parties' arbitration
agreement, the laws of the state of Michigan applied to the dispute. 78 The
arbitrators ruled in favor of M & C.7 9  The U.S. District Court then
confirmed the arbitrators' award. 8o
In its challenge to the arbitration award before the Sixth Circuit, Behr
argued that the vacatur provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. I of the
FAA, as well as the NY Convention's vacatur provisions in Art. V, applied
to this dispute.8 Behr, in its motion to vacate, relied on one vacatur
provision specified in Ch. 1 of the FAA-that the panel miscalculated the
facts in making its damage calculation-and a ground of review implied
under Ch. 1 of the FAA-that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. 82
The Sixth Circuit initially recognized that the district court had
jurisdiction, pursuant to section 20783 of Art. 2 of the FAA, to entertain a
motion to confirm and a motion to vacate an arbitration award.84
Additionally, it recognized how Art. V of the NY Convention allows a party
to object to the confirmation of an arbitration award on certain limited
grounds. 8
Judge Daughtrey, writing for the Sixth Circuit, then observed that courts
construing the vacatur provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA
have concluded that an award can be vacated pursuant to an extra-statutory
76. M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1996).
77. Id. at 846-47.
78. Id. at 846.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 850.
82. M & C, 87 F.3d at 850.
83. See infra note 242.
84. M & C, 87 F.3d at 848-49.
85. Id. at 848-49.
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ground-if the arbitrator's decision manifestly disregards the law.8 6  In
addressing whether the vacatur provisions in and implied under Ch. 1 of the
FAA would also apply to an action governed by the NY Convention and Ch.
2 of the FAA, the court argued that:
Although the New York Convention, and not the Federal Arbitration Act, usually applies
to federal court proceedings to recognize or enforce arbitration awards made in other
nations, 9 U.S.C. § 208 provides that the FAA may apply to actions brought pursuant to
the New York Convention "to the extent that [the Federal Arbitration Act] is not in
conflict with [9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208] or the Convention as ratified by the United States."
87
The court next observed, "9 U.S.C. § 207 explicitly requires that a
federal court 'shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for
refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in
the said Convention [is applicable]."' 8  Likewise, "Article V of the
Convention lists the exclusive grounds justifying refusal to recognize an
arbitral award. Those grounds.., do not include miscalculations of fact or
manifest disregard of the law."'8 9
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held it did not have jurisdiction to
entertain M & C's request, because neither the grounds of review specified
in sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA, nor manifest disregard of the
law, 9° are included in Art. V of the NY Convention. 91
ii. Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc. - Seventh Circuit - (1997)
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit in Lander Co. v. MMP Investments, Inc.,
addressed an arbitration award rendered in the U.S. after an arbitration
between two U.S. corporations, Lander Company, Inc. (Lander) and MMP
86. Id. at 850-51 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 851 (the Sixth Circuit did not attempt to define the term "conflict" or recognize its
potential significance) (second emphasis added).
88. M & C, 87 F.3d at 851 (the court did not discuss Art. VI(e) of the NY Convention)
(emphasis added).
89. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
90. The court also observed that "manifest disregard of the law" cannot be pigeonholed into
the public policy exception located in Art. V(2)(b) of the NY Convention. M & C, 87F.3d at 851
n.2. See also Nat'l Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800, 804 n.l (D. Del. 1990). For a
more detailed discussion of how the grounds of review in Art. V of the NY Convention must be
narrowly construed, see infra Part IV.C-D.
91. M&C,87F.3dat851.
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Investments, Inc. (MMP). 92 Lander won the arbitration and then sought
confirmation of the award under the NY Convention and Ch. 2 of the FAA,
and possibly Ch. 1 of the FAA, in a U.S. District Court. 93
MMP moved to dismiss Lander's suit because the NY Convention was
inapplicable-a jurisdictional argument-and also to vacate the award. 94
Lander opposed MMP's motion and argued vigorously that the NY
Convention applied and the award should not be vacated. 95 The district
court concluded the NY Convention did not apply and dismissed Lander's
suit.96
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded the district court erred in
dismissing Lander's suit on jurisdictional grounds, as Lander sufficiently
plead jurisdiction under both Art. 1 of the FAA and the NY Convention. 97
After deciding the jurisdictional issue, the Seventh Circuit decided to go one
step further and also address whether the award should be vacated. Since
the Seventh Circuit was only addressing a Motion to Dismiss, it
hypothesized:
[I]f a court asked to enforce an arbitration award has less authority to turn down the
request (in whole or part) under the Convention than under the Federal Arbitration Act,
this could make a difference in this case-and may be why Lander, the enforcing party,
was so eager to bottom jurisdiction on the Convention.
The Seventh Circuit noted how the Sixth Circuit in M & C99 found that,
"manifest disregard of the law is an implied ground for vacating an award
under [Art. 1 of the FAA], but neither an express nor, the court thought, an
implied defense to enforcement under the Convention."' 00 The Lander court
then recognized how the M & C court "held that it is indeed harder to knock
out an award under the Convention," because a party can only rely upon the
vacatur provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention. 0 Also, relying on M &
92. Lander Co. v. MMP Investments, Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 477-78 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining
the parties' dispute was considered non-domestic because it concerned a distribution agreement
centered in Poland). See supra note 6 for a more detailed discussion of non-domestic awards.
93. See Lander, supra note 92, at 478 (outlining how MMP, in its opposition papers, stressed
how it was unclear if Lander was moving under the NY Convention and/or Art. 1 of the FAA, for
confirmation).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Lander, 107 F.3d at 480 (emphasis added).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 76-91.
100. Lander, 107 F.3d at 480.
101. Id See also M & C, supra note 76, at 851.
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C and section 208102 of Art. 2 of the FAA, the Seventh Circuit observed that
"[a]lthough the Convention is not exclusive, the U.S. implementing
legislation provides that in the event of a conflict between its terms and those
of the Federal Arbitration Act the Convention's terms govern."'
0 3
The Lander court reiterated that it did not need to decide this issue-
whether manifest disregard of the law applies under the NY Convention and
Art. II of the FAA-explicitly left open by Parsons & Whittemore,'14
because neither party raised it.'0 5 However, the court observed that because
MMP's position "may be right," the issue should be considered. 0 6 This is
especially true if MMP seeks to argue that the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the law later on in the proceedings.' 0 7
The court, relying on the Second Circuit's decision in Bergesen,'0 8 then
held that the NY Convention could apply to this case, which is significant,
because the grounds of vacatur under the NY Convention are arguably
narrower than those applicable to actions governed by Ch. 1 of the FAA.' 09
Therefore, if the NY Convention applied, manifest disregard of the law
would not apply to this dispute and other disputes in the Seventh Circuit.
iii. The Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. - S.D. Cal.
-(1998)
In 1998, the Southern District of California in The Ministry of Defense
and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic
Defense Systems, Inc.," addressed the Expansion Issues. The Cubic
Defense Court was confronted with an award rendered in Zurich,
Switzerland pursuant to Iranian law, and under the auspices of the ICC."'
102. See supra note 32.
103. Lander, 107 F.3d at 481 (showing how the Lander court did not attempt to define the term
"conflict" or recognize its potential significance) (emphasis added).
104. See supra Part llI.A.i.
105. Lander, 107 F.3d at 480. This language arguably relegates the court's decision to dicta.
106. Id. at 480.
107. Id.
108. Bergesen, 710 F.2d,at 934.
109. Lander, 107 F.3d at 482.
110. The Ministry of Def. and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (S.D. Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Cubic Defense].
111. Id.atl170.
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The victorious party was The Ministry of Defense and Support for the
Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ministry of Defense), an
Iranian organization, and the losing party was Cubic Defense Systems
(Cubic), a U.S. Corporation.112 Cubic moved to vacate the award under
sections (a)-(c) of Art. V of the NY Convention. "13
In its analysis, the court first addressed whether the grounds of review in Ch.
1 of the FAA apply to actions governed by the NY Convention." 4 In
analyzing this issue, the court observed that, "[t]he statute implementing the
Convention states that a 'court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of
the grounds for refusal ... specified in the said Convention.""' 5 Relying
mainly on that provision, the court held that the grounds of review in section
10 of Art. 1 of the FAA were not applicable to an award rendered under the
NY Convention. 116
D. Courts Concluding That Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention Allows Parties
in Certain Vacatur Proceedings Brought Under the NY Convention to
Rely on the Vacatur Provisions in and Implied Under Sections 10 and
11 ofArt. 1 of the FAA
i. YusufAhmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R " Us, Inc. - Second
Circuit - (1997)
The Second Circuit revisited the Expansion Issues and delivered the
seminal Circuit Court opinion on them in 1997. In Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim
& Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc.," 7  the court addressed a motion to vacate
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1171.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1171-72 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 207) (emphasis added).
116. Cubic Defense, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1171-72; see also Ministry of Def. of the Islamic
Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 1992) (limiting discretion of district
court to grounds of refusal specified in the NY Convention); Management & Technical Consultants
S.A. v. Parsons-Jurden Int'l Corp., 820 F.2d 1531, 1533-34 (9th Cir.1987) ("Under the Convention,
an arbiter's award can be vacated only on the grounds specified in the Convention."); see also
Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at 1446 (finding that "the Convention's enumeration of defenses is
exclusive'); see discussion infra Part Ill.E.i. for a discussion of Industrial Risk; see also Yusuf 126
F.3d at 20 ("[T]he grounds for relief enumerated in Article V of the Convention are the only grounds
available for setting aside an arbitral award."); see discussion infra Part llI.D.i. for a discussion of
Yusuf seeM & C, 87 F.3d at 851 ("Article V of the Convention lists the exclusive grounds justifying
refusal to recognize an arbitral award."); see supra text accompanying notes 76-91 for a discussion
of M&C.
117. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 15; see also, Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d
194, 195 (2d Cir. 1999); Deiulemar Compagnia Di Navigazione v. Transocean Coal Co., No. 03 Civ.
18
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brought by a Kuwaiti corporation, Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons
(Alghanim), against a U.S. corporation, Toys "R" Us, Inc. (Toys "R" Us).118
The arbitration being challenged took place under the auspices of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), in the U.S. 1 9
The arbitrator awarded Alghanim $46.44 million. 2 °  Alghanim
petitioned the Southern District of New York for confirmation of the award
under the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA. 121 Toys "R" Us then filed
a motion to vacate the award under Art. 1 of the FAA. 122 It argued that the
award was clearly irrational, in manifest disregard of the law, and in
manifest disregard of the terms of the agreement-all implied grounds of
vacatur recognized under Art. 1 of the FAA. 3 In confirming the award, the
district court held that, "[t]he Convention and the FAA afford overlapping
coverage,124 and the fact that a petition to confirm is brought under the NY
Convention does not foreclose a cross-motion to vacate under [Art. 1 of] the
FAA, and the Court will consider [Toys "R" Us's] cross-motion under the
standards of the FAA." 1
25
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Second Circuit initially
concluded the NY Convention clearly applied to this dispute. 126  It then
addressed whether Art. I of the FAA also applied.127 The court noted that
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. section 207,128 "[t]he court shall confirm the award
unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or
enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention."'' 29 The court
2038 (RCC), 2004 WL 2721072, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004); Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Banco De
Seguros Del Estado, No. 02 Civ. 3653 (DC), 2003 WL 443584, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2003); Spier
v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
118. Yusuf 126 F.3dat 17.
119. Id. at 17-18.
120. Id. at 18.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933; see also discussion supra note 6.
125. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 18 (footnote added).
126. Id. at 18.
127. Id. at 19.
128. See infra note 242.
129. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 19 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 207) (emphasis added).
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next addressed Art. V of the NY Convention, 130 which includes the grounds
of review referred to in 9 U.S.C. section 207. "'
The Second Circuit subsequently framed the issues before it as follows:
1) whether, in addition to the Convention's express grounds for refusal, other grounds
can be read into the Convention by implication, much as American courts have read
implied grounds for relief into the FAA, and
(2) whether, under Article V(I)(e), the courts of the United States are authorized to apply
United States procedural arbitral law, i.e., the FAA, to nondomestic awards rendered in
the United States. 132
In addressing the first issue, the court concluded that the NY
Convention and Art. 1 of the FAA provide "overlapping coverage" to the
extent they do not conflict. 3 3  To the contrary, "to the extent that the
Convention prescribes the exclusive grounds for relief from an award under
the Convention, that application of [Art. 1] the FAA's implied grounds
would be in conflict, and is thus precluded."'
3 4
After concluding that only the grounds of review in Art. V of the NY
Convention can apply to a vacatur proceeding under the NY Convention, the
court addressed the scope of Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention. This
provision allows vacatur of an award if "[t]he award ... has been set aside
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
law of which, that award was made." 1
35
130. See supra note 9.
131. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 19.
132. Id. at 19-20.
133. Id. at 20.
134. Id. at 20 (citing M & C, 87 F.3d at 851) (concluding that the NY Convention's exclusive
grounds for relief "do not include miscalculations of fact or manifest disregard of the law")
(emphasis added); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 & n.15 (1974);
Parsons, 508 F.2d at 973; Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera,
Industrial Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to apply a "manifest
disregard of law" standard on a motion to vacate a foreign arbitral award); Brandeis lntsel Ltd. v.
Calabrian Chems. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("the 'manifest disregard' defense
is not available under Article V of the Convention or otherwise to a party ... seeking to vacate an
award of foreign arbitrators based upon foreign law."); see also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 8, at 265
("the grounds mentioned in Article V are exhaustive," which is consistent with the NY Convention's
pro-enforcement bias).
135. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 20 (quoting NY Convention art. V(l)(e)) (emphasis added).
20
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol9/iss1/2
[Vol. 9:1, 2008]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
The Second Circuit then distinguished two decisions, 3 6 in which the
respective district courts refused to apply grounds of vacatur implied under
Ch. I of the FAA to actions governed by the NY Convention, because
according to the Yusuf court, the requests were made in the context of
"petitions to confirm awards rendered abroad." '137 Significantly, the Second
Circuit observed, "These [two district] courts were not presented with the
question whether Article V(I)(e) authorizes an action to set aside an arbitral
award under the domestic law of the state in which, or under which, the
award was rendered."13 Or in other words, where the arbitral award "was
rendered in the United States, and both confirmation and vacatur were then
sought in the United States." 3 9
The court then concluded: "Article V(1)(e) of the Convention...
allow[s] a court in the country under whose law the arbitration was
conducted to apply domestic arbitral law, in this case the FAA, to a motion
to set aside or vacate that arbitral award."1 40  The court reasoned that
"because the Convention allows the district court to refuse to enforce an
award that has been vacated by a competent authority in the country where
the award was rendered, the court may apply FAA standards to a motion to
vacate a non-domestic award rendered in the United States."
1 41
In further support of its reasoning, the Yusuf court argued that its
analysis was consistent with the Sixth Circuit's in M & C,142 which
previously held that, "[i]t should not apply the FAA's implied grounds for
vacatur, because the United States did not provide the law of the arbitration
for the purposes of Article V(1)(e) of the Convention." 143  Also, with the
Southern District of New York's decision in Int'l Standard, which
136. See Yusuf 126 F.3d at 20 n.2 ("In both Celulsa Del Pacifico S.A. v. A. Ahlstrom Corp., No.
95 Civ. 9586, 1996 WL 103826 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1996), and Avraham v. Shigur Express Ltd., No.
91 Civ. 1238, 1991 WL 177633 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1991), district courts in [the Second] Circuit
refused to recognize the applicability of... [the grounds of review in and implied under sections 10
and 11 Art. 1 of the FAA] to nondomestic awards that had been rendered in the United States and
were subject to confirmation under the [NY] Convention. However, [the two district courts did not]
address the significance of Article V(1)(e) [of the NY Convention].").
137. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 20.
138. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
139. Id. at21.
140. Id. at21.
141. Id. at 21 (citing Spector v. Torenberg, 852 F. Supp. 201, 205-06 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(emphasis added).
142. See supra note 76.
143. Yusuf,126F.3dat21(citingM& C, 87F.3dat849).
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concluded "that only the state under whose procedural law the arbitration
was conducted has jurisdiction under Article V(1)(e) to vacate the award,
whereas on a petition for confirmation made in any other state, only the
defenses to confirmation listed in Article V of the Convention are
available."'"
Moreover, the Second Circuit relied on numerous commentators'
writings on the Convention's vacatur provisions. 145 According to the court,
the commentators determined that "an action to set aside an international
arbitral award, as contemplated by Article V(1)(e), is controlled by the
domestic law of the rendering state."'146 The court then recognized:
From the plain language and history of the Convention, it is thus apparent that a party
may seek to vacate or set aside an award in the state in which, or under the law of which,
the award is rendered. Moreover, the language and history of the Convention make it
clear that such a motion is to be governed by domestic law of the rendering state, despite
the fact that the award is non-domestic within the meaning of the Convention as we have
interpreted it in Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932.147
Finally, the Yusuf court adopted the following two-prong test for the
review of arbitration awards governed by the NY Convention:
In sum, we conclude that the Convention mandates very different regimes for the review
of arbitral awards (I) in the state in which, or under the law of which, the award was
made, and (2) in other states where recognition and enforcement are sought. The
Convention specifically contemplates that the state in which, or under the law of which,
the award is made, will be free to set aside or modify an award in accordance with its
domestic arbitral law and its full panoply of express and implied grounds for relief See
Convention art. V(I)(e). However, the Convention is equally clear that when an action
144. Id. at 21 (citing Int'l Standard, 745 F. Supp. at 178).
145. ld. at 21.
146. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 21. The court further observed that:
The possible effect of this ground for refusal [Article V(1)(e)] is that, as the award can be
set aside in the country of origin on all grounds contained in the arbitration law of that
country, including the public policy of that country, the grounds for refusal of
enforcement under the Convention may indirectly be extended to include all kinds of
particularities of the arbitration law of the country of origin. This might undermine the
limitative character of the grounds for refusal listed in Article V... and thus decrease
the degree of uniformity existing under the Convention... The defense in Article V(1)(e)
incorporates the entire body of review rights in the issuingjurisdiction.... If the scope of
judicial review in the rendering state extends beyond the other six defenses allowed under
the New York Convention, the losing party's opportunity to avoid enforcement is
automatically enhanced: The losing party can first attempt to derail the award on appeal
on grounds that would not be permitted elsewhere during enforcement proceedings.
Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
147. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 23; see discussion supra note 6 for a discussion of non-domestic
awards.
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for enforcement is brought in a foreign state, the state may refuse to en/orce the award
only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Article V 
of the Convention.
ii. Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Marketing Strategies -W.D. MI. -
(2003)
In 2003, the Western District of Michigan 149 addressed the Expansion
Issues 150 in Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int.'l Marketing Strategies. 5 ' The court
was confronted with a dispute between an English corporation, Jacada
(Europe) Ltd., f/k/a Client/Server Technology (Europe), Ltd. (Jacada) and a
U.S. corporation, International Marketing Strategies (IMS). 152 The award at
issue was rendered in the U.S. and under Michigan state law.' When
addressing the applicable grounds of vacatur, the district court first observed
how 9 U.S.C. section 207154 states that the grounds of review in Art. V of
the NY Convention, 55 are the only grounds that can be relied upon in a
vacatur proceeding brought under the NY Convention.156 In other words,
the grounds are exclusive. 1
57
The court then addressed how the Yusuf court 15  circumvented this
conclusion by its interpretation of Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention.1 59
Relying on Yusuf and its interpretation of Art. V(I)(e), the Jacada I court
determined that "[b]ecause Jacada [English Corporation] has moved to set
aside or vacate an arbitral award entered in the United States, this Court may
apply its domestic arbitral law to set aside or vacate that arbitral award."'
160
148. Yusuf 126 F.3d at 23 (emphasis added).
149. This court is located in the Sixth Circuit.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19.
151. Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Marketing Strategies, 255 F. Supp. 2d 744 (W.D. Mich.
2003) [hereinafter Jacada 1].
152. Id. at 745.
153. Id. at 745-46.
154. See infra note 242.
155. See supra note 9.
156. Jacada 1,255 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
157. Id.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 117-48.
159. Jacada 1, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 749. See also supra note 9.
160. Id .at 750.
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iii. Jacada v. Int'l Marketing Strategies, Inc. - Sixth Circuit - (2005)
In 2005, nine years after its decision in M & C,161 the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the Western District of Michigan's decision in Jacada I, in Jacada
v. Int'l Marketing Strategies, Inc.. 162 Like the district court in Jacada I, the
Sixth Circuit in Jacada II relied on Yusuf and concluded that Art. V(l)(e) 163
of the NY Convention applied if the award at issue was made in the U.S. and
confirmation and vacatur were also sought in the U.S.'64
In concluding that Art. V(I)(e) of the NY Convention applied, the
Jacada II court attempted to distinguish M & C, a prior decision rendered by
a different panel of Sixth Circuit judges. First, the court recognized that Art.
1 of the FAA did not apply to cases governed by the NY Convention, if Art.
I of the FAA was "in conflict" with the NY Convention or its implementing
legislation. 16  Without defining the term "conflict," or discussing its
significance, the court concluded that there was no conflict and the vacatur
provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA applied. 1
66
Second, the Jacada II court recognized how the award in M & C was
made in England and confirmation sought in the U.S., while the award in
Jacada II was made in the U.S. and confirmation also sought in the U.S.
1 67
Since the award at issue in Jacada II was made in the U.S., and confirmation
was also sought in the U.S., Art. V(1)(e) authorized the court to apply the
domestic procedural law of the state where the award was made, in this case,
U.S. law. 1
68
161. See supra text accompanying notes 76-91 for a discussion of M & C.
162. Jacada H, 401 F.3d at 735.
163. See supra note 9.
164. Jacada H, 401 F.3d at 709.
165. Id. at 709 n.8.
166. 1d.
167. Id. at 709.
168. Id. Art. Ill of the NY Convention dictates:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon,
under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the
recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
NY Convention art. III (emphasis added).
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iv. Admart AG; Heller Werkstatt Gesmbh v. Stephen and Mary Birch
Foundation - Third Circuit - (2006)
In 2006, the Third Circuit addressed the scope of the Expansion Issues
in Admart AG v. Stephen and Mary Birch Foundation. 169 The arbitration at
issue took place in Switzerland and was governed by Swiss law. 17 0 It was
between a U.S. corporation, Stephen and Mary Birch Foundation, Inc. (Birch
Foundation), and various other parties, including a Swiss corporation,
Admart AG (Admart).171 The arbitrators ruled in favor of Admart and the
District Court confirmed the award. 172
On appeal, the Third Circuit remarked that an arbitration award must be
confirmed unless one of the grounds specified in Art. V of the NY
Convention applies. 173 The court next addressed Yusuf and noted how that
decision established a two-prong approach for the confirmation of arbitration
awards--(i) for those "awards rendered in the same nation as the site of the
arbitral proceeding" and (ii) "those rendered in a foreign country.' 74
Further, how the Yusuf court "concluded that more flexibility was available
when the arbitration site and the site of the confirmation proceeding were
within the same jurisdiction." 175
On the other hand, the Third Circuit recognized how the Yusuf court
found that "the [C]onvention is equally clear that when an action for
enforcement is brought in a foreign state, the state may refuse to enforce the
award only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the
Convention."' 176 Moreover, "[T]here is now considerable case law holding
that, in an action to confirm an award rendered in, or under the law of, a
foreign jurisdiction, the grounds for relief enumerated in Article V of the
Convention are the only grounds available for setting aside an arbitral
award." 1
77
Since the award at issue was rendered in a different state than where
confirmation was sought, the court found that only those grounds of review
169. Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., 457 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006).
170. Id. at 302.
171. Id. at 303.
172. Id. at 305.
173. Id. at 307-08.
174. Id. at 308 (citing Yusuf 126 F.3d at 22-23).
175. Admart, 457 F.3d at 308 (citing Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 22-23).
176. Id. at 308 (quoting Yusuf 126 F.3d at 22-23).
177. Id. at 308 (quoting Yusuf 126 F.3d at 20) (emphasis added).
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enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention could be relied upon by the
party challenging the award.178
E. Courts Concluding that Art. V(1) (e) of the NY Convention Does not Allow
Parties to Rely on the Vacatur Provisions in and Implied Under Sections
10 and 11 ofArt. 1 of the FAA in a Vacatur Proceeding Governed by
Art. V of the NY Convention
i. Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte - Eleventh
Circuit - (1998)
About eight months after the Yusuf decision, the Eleventh Circuit
weighed in on the Expansion Issues in Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N.
Gutehoffnungshutte."7 9 This matter involved numerous U.S. corporations:
Nitram, Inc. (Nitram), Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI), Barnard and Burk
Group, Inc. (Barnard), Barnard and Burk Engineers and Constructors, Inc.
(Barnard Engineers), American Home Assurance Company (AHAC) and
ISI, Inc. (ISI), and a German Corporation, M.A.N. Maschinenfabrik
Augsburg-Niimberg AG (M.A.N.). 8 0
Nitram commenced an action in Florida state court against IRI, Barnard,
Barnard Engineers, and ISI. 181 The case was removed to federal court.
82
Barnard, Barnard Engineers, and ISI proceeded to file a third-party claim
178. Id. at 308-09.
179. Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at 1434 ; see also Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v.
Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335, n.5 (S.D. Fla. 2003). The arbitration award at issue was
rendered in Miami, Florida, under the auspices of the AAA, and did not involve a U.S. corporation.
id. The Four Seasons court observed that the decisions in Industrial Risk and Yusuf are inconsistent.
Id. The Second Circuit in Yusufdistinguished between a motion to confirm and a motion to vacate,
while the Eleventh Circuit in Industrial Risk did not distinguish between the proceedings. Id. Also,
Yusuf concluded that the vacatur provisions in and implied under sections 10 and I I of Art. I of the
FAA were applicable to a non-domestic award rendered in the U.S., while the Industrial Risk court
concluded that only the NY Convention's vacatur provisions in Art. V applied to a non-domestic
award rendered in the U.S. Id. Based on Industrial Risk's holding, the Four Seasons' court
concluded the NY Convention's vacatur provisions were exclusive and that the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard sometimes applied in vacatur proceedings brought pursuant to Ch. I of the
FAA, is never applicable in actions governed by the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA. Id. at
1341. See also, Nicor Int'l Corp. v. El Paso Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1160, n.7 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(observing the existence of a possible circuit split between Industrial Risk and Yusuf as to whether
grounds of vacatur outside of Art. V of the NY Convention apply to actions governed by the NY
Convention).
180. Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at 1437-38.
181. Id. at 1438.
182. Id.
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against M.A.N. Thereafter, M.A.N. moved to compel arbitration pursuant to
an arbitration clause in the parties' contract. 183 An arbitration subsequently
took place in Tampa, Florida, under the AAA's rules and governed by
Florida law. 84 The arbitration panel found in favor of M.A.N. and against
Barnard, Barnard Engineers, and IS1.185
The losing parties filed a motion to vacate, and one of their defenses to
the arbitration award was not enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention.
However, the defense, that the arbitral award should be vacated on the
ground that it is "arbitrary and capricious," is recognized by numerous
courts as an implied ground of review under Art. 1 of the FAA. 86 The
district court held that Ch. 1 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. sections 1-16 (1994), as
well as the NY Convention's vacatur provisions in Art. V, applied to this
dispute. 187
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit framed the issue before it as follows:
Do the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards... and thus the provisions of Chapter 2 of the FAA, govern an arbitral award
granted to a foreign corporation by an arbitral panel sitting in the United States and
applying American federal or state law?
188
The Eleventh Circuit overruled the district court and concluded that only
Ch. 2 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. sections 201-208, governing non-domestic
arbitral proceedings, applied to this dispute. 8 9
Judge Tjoflat, writing for the Eleventh Circuit, initially concluded that
the award at issue was an award not considered domestic in the country
where enforcement was sought.' 90 Accordingly, he then observed, that the
"Tampa panel's arbitral award must be confirmed unless appellants can
successfully assert one of the seven defenses against enforcement of the
award enumerated in Article V of the New York Convention."' 191
Thereafter, the court stated that the "New York Convention's enumeration of
defenses against enforcement is exclusive."1
92
183. Id. at 1438-39.
184. Id. at 1439.
185. Id.
186. Industrial Risk, 141 F.3dat 1443.
187. Id. at 1440.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. See supra note 6 for a more detailed discussion of non-domestic awards.
191. IndustrialRisk, 141 F.3d at 1441 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 1442 (emphasis added).
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The court subsequently argued that the omission of the arbitrary and
capricious defense from the NY Convention's seven vacatur provisions is
"decisive," despite how the award was made and the enforcement sought in
the same signatory state."' In support of that argument, the court
recognized that "Section 207 of Chapter 2 of the FAA explicitly requires
that a federal court 'shall confirm [an international arbitral] award unless it
finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of ... enforcement of the
award specified in the [New York] Convention."", 194  Further, "[t]he
Convention itself provides that 'enforcement of [an] award may be refused,
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party
furnishes... proof that' one of the enumerated defenses is applicable."'' 95
The Eleventh Circuit then concluded "that no defense against enforcement of
an international arbitral award under Chapter 2 of the FAA is available on
the ground that the award is 'arbitrary and capricious,' or on any other
grounds not specified by the Convention."' 196
F. Courts Allowing Certain Challenges to Arbitration Awards Outside of
Art. V of the NY Convention Because the Challenges Are Arguably
Distinct From the Grounds of teview in Art. V of the NY Convention
i. China Minmetals Materials Import and Export Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei
Corp. - Third Circuit - (2003)
The Third Circuit addressed the Expansion Issues about three years
before its decision in Admart in China Minmetals Materials Import &
Export Co v. Chi Mei Corp.197 An arbitration was conducted in China,
before the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission.' 9" The dispute was between a U.S. corporation, Chi Mei
Corporation (Chi Mei), and two Chinese corporations, China Minmetals
Materials Import and Export Co., Ltd. (China Minmetals) and Production
193. Id. at 1446.
194. Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at 1446 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 207) (emphasis added).
195. Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at 1446 (citing Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, T.I.A.S. No.
6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 note) (emphasis added).
196. Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at 1446 (emphasis added).
197. China Minmetals Materials Import & Export Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274 (3d Cir.
2003).
198. Id. at 277.
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Goods and Materials Trading Corp. of Shantou S.E.Z. (Shantou).' 99 China
Minmetals was victorious. z0
China Minmetals moved to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. 20
Chi Mei opposed China Minmetals' motion to confirm and also cross-moved
to deny China Minmetals' requests. 202 Additionally, Chi Mei requested the
court rule on the validity of the underlying arbitration agreement.0 3 The
district court entered an order granting Minmetals' motion to confirm and
enforce the award and denying Chi Mei's cross-motion.2 4  Chi Mei
appealed the district court's decision to the Third Circuit.
205
The Third Circuit observed:
The primary issue in this case is whether the district court properly enforced the foreign
arbitration panel's award where that panel, in finding that it had jurisdiction, rejected Chi
Mei's argument that the documents providing for arbitration were forged so that there
was not any valid writing exhibiting an intent to arbitrate.
20 6
The court recognized that the primary issue involved two distinct
questions. The first, if a court "must consider whether a foreign arbitration
award might be enforceable regardless of the validity of the arbitration
clause on which the foreign body rested its jurisdiction. 20 7  China
Minmetals argued that the general provisions in Art. 1 of the FAA and the
NY Convention are different.20 8  Particularly, the grounds of review
enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention are very limited and do not
include whether there was a valid written arbitration agreement.20 9 China
Minmetals then argued that since the potential ground of vacatur relied upon
by Chi Mei was not enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention the court
could not consider it.
210
The second distinct question concerned the "district court's role, if any,
in reviewing the foreign arbitral panel's finding that there was a valid
199. Id. at 276-77.
200. Id. at 278.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 278.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 279. This issue is arguably resolved by Art. 11 (3) of the NY Convention.
207. Id. at 279.
208. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 279.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 278.
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agreement to arbitrate." '' In analyzing the two questions, the Third Circuit
first examined 9 U.S.C. section 207.212 It then laid out the vacatur
provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention.213 Next, it observed pursuant to
9 U.S.C. section 208,214 that the provisions in Ch. 1 of the FAA-including
its vacatur provisions-are applicable to actions brought under the NY
Convention, to the extent that Ch. 1 of the FAA's provisions do not
"conflict" with the NY Convention. 15
The court next recognized that the grounds of review under Art. V of the
NY Convention were construed narrowly. 216  Relying on Yusuf' 7 and
various other decisions, the Third Circuit argued that considerable case law
has held that in "an action to confirm an award rendered in, or under the law
of, a foreign jurisdiction, the grounds for relief enumerated in Article V of
the NY Convention are the only grounds available for setting aside an
arbitral award. ' '218  This narrow construction is consistent with 9 U.S.C.
section 207,219 which states an award shall be confirmed unless one of the
grounds specified in the NY Convention is satisfied.220 Thereafter, the court
observed that "[t]he absence of a written agreement is not articulated
specifically as a ground for refusal to enforce an award under Article V of
the Convention.' 22'
Despite how the court stresses that the only grounds of review a party
can rely upon in a vacatur proceeding brought pursuant to the NY
Convention are found in Art. V of the NY Convention, and how Art. V of
the NY Convention does not include a ground of review specifying that an
arbitration agreement has to be in writing, the Third Circuit concluded that
the district court could consider whether the agreement was enforceable
because arbitration is a matter of contract. 222 In reaching its conclusion, the
211. Id. at 279.
212. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 279; see also discussion infra note 242.
213. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 279-80; see also discussion supra note 9.
214. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 280; see also discussion supra note 32.
215. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 280 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 208).
216. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 283; see discussion infra Parts IV.C-D for a more detailed
discussion on how the grounds of review in Art. V of the NY Convention were meant to be narrowly
construed.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 117-48.
218. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 283 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
219. See discussion infra note 242.
220. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 283 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 207).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 286. The China Minmetals court does not rely on Art. 11(3) of the NY Convention,
which arguably resolves this issue. This section states that:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which
the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the
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court distinguished Yusufi23 and observed that "Minmetals cannot point to
any case interpreting Art. V of the Convention so narrowly as to preclude
that defense [that the agreement needs to be in writing] and we are aware of
none." 224  Finally, the court held that "a district court should refuse to
enforce an arbitration award under the Convention where the parties did not
reach a valid agreement to arbitrate [one not in writing], at least in the
absence of a waiver of the objection to arbitration by the party opposing
enforcement.
2 5
ii. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L. C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi - Fifth Circuit - (2003)
In 2003, the Fifth Circuit addressed the Expansion Issues for the first
time in Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi. 226 The dispute before the court involved an arbitration that took place
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
NY Convention art. 11(3) (emphasis added).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 117-48.
224. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 286.
225. Id. at 286.
226. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Prusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi, 335 F.3d 357 (5th
Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Kahara Bodas 1]. See also Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 287-88, 309 (5th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Karaha
Bodas 11]. Karaha Bodas 1H involved a dispute between the same parties in Karaha Bodas 1, but
before a different panel of Fifth Circuit judges. Karaha Bodas I, 364 F.3d at 281 n.3. The Karaha
Bodas 11 court elaborated on the difference between primary and secondary jurisdictions as follows:
Article V enumerates the grounds on which a court with secondary jurisdiction may
refuse enforcement. In contrast to the limited authority of secondary jurisdiction courts
to review an arbitral award, courts of primary jurisdiction, usually the courts of the
country of the arbitral situs, have much broader discretion to set aside an award. While
courts of a primary jurisdiction country may apply their own domestic law in evaluating a
request to annul or set aside an arbitral award, courts in countries of secondary
jurisdiction may refuse enforcement only on the grounds specified in Article V.
The New York Convention and the implementing legislation, Chapter 2 of the FAA,
provide that a secondary jurisdiction court must enforce an arbitration award unless it
finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement specified in
the Convention. The court may not refuse to enforce an arbitral award solely on the
ground that the arbitrator may have made a mistake of law or fact.
Id. at 287-88 (citation omitted).
Moreover, "Article V(1)(e) of the Convention provides that a court of secondary jurisdiction may
refuse to enforce an arbitral award if it 'has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."' Id. at 289 (quoting 9
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in Switzerland between a Cayman Islands corporation, Karaha Bodas
Company, L.L.C. (KBC), and an Indonesian government owned corporation,
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Perusahaan),
under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law.227 The arbitration panel rendered a substantial award in favor ofKB~C. 228
Perusahaan appealed the award to the Swiss Supreme Court, and shortly
thereafter, while the appeal was pending, KBC initiated a confirmation
proceeding in the U.S. District Court.229 In opposing KBC's request for
confirmation in the U.S. district court, Perusahaan filed a motion to vacate
the award.23 ° In its motion to vacate, Perusahaan relied on four grounds of
review enumerated in the NY Convention.23 ' The District Court granted
KBC's request for confirmation and Perusahaan appealed.232 Significantly,
in its appeal, among other issues raised, Perusahaan challenged the district
court's authority to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting it from
prosecuting a parallel proceeding it commenced in Indonesia. 233
Perusahaan made several arguments before the Fifth Circuit, only one of
which is important for purposes of this article. The argument was that the
district court lacked authority to issue the preliminary injunction, because it
was not a ground of review enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention. 234
Relying on Yusuf,235 the Fifth Circuit first observed, "The New York
Convention governs the confirmation and enforcement of the Award and
'mandates very different regimes for the review of arbitral awards (1) in the
[countries] in which, or under the law of which, the award was made, and (2)
in other [countries] where recognition and enforcement are sought.' 236 The
court also observed a country has primary jurisdiction over an award if it is
U.S.C. § 201, art. V(1)(e)). "Courts have held that the language, 'the competent authority of the
country... under the law of which, that award was made' refers exclusively to procedural and not
substantive law, and more precisely, to the regimen or scheme of arbitral procedural law under
which the arbitration was conducted, and not the substantive law ... applied in the case."' Id. at 289
(quoting Int'l Standard, 745 F. Supp. at 178).
227. Karaha Bodas I, 335 F.3d at 360-61.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 361.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Karaha Bodas 1, 335 F.3d at 361.
233. Id. at 363. The remainder of the procedural aspects of this case are complex and need not
be discussed for purposes of this article.
234. Karaha Bodas I, 335 F.3d at 363.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 117-48.
236. Karaha Bodas 1, 335 F.3d at 364. See also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l
Petroleum Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d 783, 792 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
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faced with an award in "the country in which, or under the [arbitration] law
of which, [an] award was made."2 31 On the other hand, all other signatory
states are considered to have secondary jurisdiction and "can only contest
whether that State should enforce the arbitral award.,
238
Based on this two-pronged approach, Perushaan argued, "The limitation
of being a court of secondary jurisdiction ... also deprives the district court
of the competence to issue injunctive relief here., 239  The Fifth Circuit
rejected that argument and held:
Although these treaty obligations limit the grounds on which the court can refuse to
enforce a foreign arbitral award, there is nothing in the Convention or implementing
legislation that expressly limits the inherent authority of a federal court to grant
injunctive relief with respect to a party over whom it has jurisdiction. Given the absence
of an express provision, we discern no authority for holding that the New York
Convention divests the district court of its inherent authority to issue an anti-suit
injunction.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Consensus among the federal courts dictates that the grounds of
review enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention are the only grounds of
review a court can consider in a vacatur proceeding brought pursuant to the
NY Convention. 24' The Consensus, clear from courts' resolution of the
Expansion Issues, is erroneous for various reasons.
237. Karaha Bodas 1, 335 F.3d at 364 (quoting NY Convention, art. V(1)(e)).
238. Id. at 364.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 365.
241. The Consensus, initially referred to supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text, is arguably
undermined by various courts, including the China Minmetals court. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at
278-90. These courts allow parties to argue that an arbitration award should be vacated after an
arbitration if the parties arguably never agreed to arbitrate-for example, if a signature was forged
on the agreement. This is despite how the lack of a written agreement is not a ground of review
enumerated in Art. V of the NY Convention. Although courts addressing this issue do not rely on
Art. 11 (3) of the NY Convention, that section may speak to, and resolve this issue. NY Convention
art. 11(3). Art. 11 (3) allows a court to refer parties to arbitration unless the agreement at issue is
found to be "null and void inoperative or incapable of being performed." Id. Although this section
does not speak directly to confirmation or vacatur proceedings, a compelling argument can be made
that a court, even at the confirmation or vacatur stage, should make an independent determination
about the enforceability of an arbitration clause.
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Initially, the operative/material provisions in section 207242 of the NY
Convention have virtually the same meaning as the operative/material
provisions in section 9 of Ch. 1243 of the FAA, and therefore, should have
been applied in the same way. The underlying intent of both provisions is to
ensure that judicial review of arbitration awards under both Art. 1 of the
FAA and the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA are extremely
limited. 2 " Significantly, however, despite the similarities in the
operative/material language, only courts addressing the grounds of vacatur
in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA have concluded that extra-
statutory grounds of review can be relied upon.
The Consensus must be further questioned because courts addressing the
Expansion Issues do not define the word "conflict" in section 208245 of Ch. 2
of the FAA or recognize its potential significance. Moreover, virtually all
courts addressing the grounds of vacatur applicable under the NY
Convention and Ch. 2 of the FAA have misconstrued Art. V(l)(e) of the NY
Convention.246 In sidestepping the Consensus that has resulted from the
resolution of the Expansion Issues, through Art. V(1)(e), courts have applied
grounds of vacatur outside of Art. V of the NY Convention in situations
where confirmation or vacatur of an arbitration award is sought in the same
signatory state where the award was rendered. 247 To reach this conclusion,
courts have ignored how the material/operative language in Art. V(1)(e) of• " •2481
the NY Convention is in the past tense.
242. Section 207 of the NY Convention states: "The court shall confirm the award unless it
finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified
in the said Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 207 (emphasis added).
243. Section 9 of Ch. 1 of the FAA states:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered
upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any
time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant
such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
sections 10 and II of this title.
9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added).
244. See Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85 (2d
Cir. 2005). "Given the strong public policy in favor of international arbitration.., review of arbitral
awards under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards is very limited in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling
disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation." Id. at 90 (quoting Yusuf 126 F.3d
at 23).
245. See supra note 32.
246. The only circuit court that has questioned the conclusion about Art. V(l)(e) is the
Industrial Risk court. See supra notes 179-96 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 9.
248. See infra Part IV.D.
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Additionally, many of the same courts also ignore how all the NY
Convention's vacatur provisions have historically been narrowly
construed. 249 Assuming that courts will even consider whether parties can
contract to expand the judicial review provisions in Art. V of the NY
Convention, after recognizing how the Expansion Issues were resolved in
the negative, courts will likely rely upon (i) Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd,25 ° Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford, Junior University,25 and First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan;2 2 (ii) various cases addressing whether parties can contract to
expand the judicial review provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the
FAA; and (iii) commentators' writings addressing the same issue.
2 53
The majority of the courts and commentators addressing whether parties
can contract to expand the judicial review provisions in sections 10 and 11
of Ch. 1 of the FAA-(ii) and (iii) above-rely upon how select Supreme
Court decisions-(i) above-resolved analogous issues. These courts and
commentators attempt to resolve this issue, among other ways, by balancing
two of the most important policies underlying Art. I of the FAA and the NY
Convention: enforcing parties' agreements according to their terms-found
in section 2 of Art. 1 of the FAA and section 202 of Art. 2 of the FAA-and
promoting the efficiency arbitration as a form of dispute resolution,
compared to litigation, is supposed to provide.254
As a result of the Consensus, however, courts addressing whether
parties can contract to expand the judicial review provisions in Art. V of the
NY Convention will downplay or completely ignore how other courts
balanced these two policies when they addressed whether expansion was
appropriate under Art. 1 of the FAA. Since the significance of these
provisions will be ignored, it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell how courts
will balance the efficiency arbitration as an institution is supposed to provide
when compared to litigation, with enforcing parties' agreements according
to their terms, and accordingly, whether parties can contract to expand the
249. See infra Part IV.C.
250. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213.
251. Volt, 489 U.S. 468.
252. First Options, 514 U.S. 938.
253. The latter two groups of sources will not be addressed in great detail here. For a more
detailed discussion, see Chafetz, supra note 24, at 1.
254. See infra Parts IV.E-G. These three sources, irrespective of how they balance the two
underlying policies, will not be very persuasive, because the Consensus resolves the Expansion
Issues in the negative.
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judicial review provisions applicable to the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the
FAA.
A. The Similarities Between the Operative/Material Language in Section 207
of Ch. 2 of the FAA and Section 9 of Ch. 1 of the FAA
Courts that refuse to apply the vacatur provisions in and implied under
Ch. 1 of the FAA to actions governed by the NY Convention are incorrect.
This is due to the similarities in the operative/material language present in
section 207 of Art. 2 of the FAA and section 9 of Ch. 1 of the FAA. The
operative/material language in these two provisions has a very similar, if not
identical meaning.
Section 207 of Art. 2 of the FAA states: "The court shall confirm the
award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition
or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.'255
Section 9 of Art. 1 of the FAA states:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered
upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any
time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant
such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
sections 10 and 11 of this title. 25 6
Although 9 U.S.C. section 207 and 9 U.S.C. section 9 do not include
identical language, certain operative/material terms, including "shall" and
"must", have virtually identical meanings. First, in the context of laws,
regulations or directives, "shall" is used to "express what is mandatory. '2 57
Likewise, "must" is defined as "be required by law, custom, or moral
conscience" or "be commanded or requested".2 58  As both terms describe
something that has to be done without exception, their meanings are
virtually identical. Because the meaning of the terms is virtually
indistinguishable, their application should also be the same if the other
material/operative terms surrounding them have the same meaning.
Second, 9 U.S.C. section 207 includes the operative/material term
"specified" and 9 U.S.C. section 9 uses the operative/material term
"prescribed," before laying out the provisions parties have to rely upon when
255. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (emphasis added).
256. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added).
257. Merriam Webster Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/shall (last visited Oct. 6,
2008).
258. Merriam Webster Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/must (last visited Oct. 6,
2008).
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addressing a motion to confirm or vacate. The term "specified" means "to
name or state explicitly or in detail", 59 while the term "prescribed" means
"to lay down a rule ... to lay down as a guide, direction, or rule of action"
or" to specify with authority. '260 Both of these terms set a defined limit on
what vacatur provisions a party can rely upon when seeking to vacate an
arbitration award under either Art. 1 of the FAA, or the NY Convention and
Art. 2 of the FAA. Therefore, because the language modifying the grounds
of review that have to be relied upon is virtually identical, the provisions
should have been construed in the same fashion.
Finally, both provisions include the operative/material term "unless,"
which in this context means "except on the condition that: under any other
circumstance than.",26' The use of the term "unless" establishes for both
provisions that an award can only be vacated if one of the subject vacatur
provisions subsequently specified is satisfied.
Accordingly, the use of the term "unless," coupled with "shall" or
"must", and "prescribed" or "specified", would seem to conclusively
establish that the grounds of review set forth in Art. 1 of the FAA and the
NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA are the only grounds of review a
party can rely upon when attempting to vacate an arbitration award under
either Art. 1 of the FAA or the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA.
Despite how the text of 9 U.S.C. section 9262 seems to mandate that
vacatur provisions outside of sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA cannot
be relied upon in a vacatur proceeding brought under Ch. 1 of the FAA, all
of the federal circuit courts construing this text have concluded that manifest
disregard of the law can be relied upon although it is not a ground of review
enumerated in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA. 2 63  Additionally,
most federal circuit courts have recognized other implied grounds of review
outside of those specified in sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA.M
259. Merriam Webster Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/specified (last visited Oct.
6, 2008).
260. Merriam Webster Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/prescribed (last visited Oct.
6, 2008).
261. Merriam Webster Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/unless (last visited Oct. 6,
2008).
262. See supra note 19.
263. See Birmingham News Co. v. Hom, 901 So. 2d 27, 48-49 (Ala. 2004) (collecting cases illustrating
how every circuit recognizes manifest disregard of the law).
264. See, e.g., Manion v. Nagin, 392 F.3d 294, 298-99 (8th Cir. 2004) (recognizing a
"completely irrational" extra-statutory ground of review); Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von
Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir. 2004) (recognizing the same ground of review); Brown v.
99
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To the contrary, despite language with a virtually identical meaning,
courts construing the grounds of vacatur applicable under the NY
Convention have concluded that only those grounds of review enumerated in
Art. V of the NY Convention can be relied upon.265 This anomalous result is
clear from the Consensus in how courts have resolved the Expansion Issues.
None of the courts addressing the Expansion Issues under the NY
Convention have sufficiently addressed this inconsistent treatment of the
virtually identical meanings of the operative/material language. As a result
of this failure, those courts that have reached the conclusion that the grounds
of review in Art. V of the NY Convention are exclusive are incorrect. 266
Since the courts addressing the Expansion Issues do not acknowledge that
the meanings of the material/operative language in the two provisions are
virtually identical, the same courts will also most likely misconstrue whether
parties can contract to expand the judicial review provisions enumerated in
Art. V of the NY Convention.
B. The Meaning of the Term "Conflict" in Section 208 of the NY Convention
is Misconstrued and/or Ignored
Pursuant to section 208 of Art. 2 of the FAA, all the provisions in Art. 1
of the FAA apply to the NY Convention to the extent they do not "conflict"
Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11 th Cir. 1993) (recognizing an "arbitrary or
capricious" extra-statutory ground of review); U.S. Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
847 F.2d 775, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (recognizing the "arbitrary or capricious" standard as well);
Safeway Stores v. Am. Bakery and Confectionery Workers, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.
1968) (recognizing that if an award is arbitrary or capricious, courts would not enforce it); Hruban v.
Steinman, No. 01-2277, 2002 WL 1723889 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing a "public policy" extra-
statutory ground of review); Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d
850, 853 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a "public policy" review standard); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Airline Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665, 671 (1 1th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (recognizing a
"public policy" extra-statutory ground of review); Nauru Phosphate Royalties, Inc. v. Drago Daic
Interests, Inc., 138 F.3d 160, 165 (recognizing an extra-statutory ground of review where the award
"fails to draw its essence from the underlying contract" (citing Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis,
26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1994)); Anderman/Smith Operating Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that an arbitrator's decision must "draw its essence" from the contract); Manville
Forest Prod. Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 831 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing
a ground of review based on a "violation of public policy" standard).
265. Logically, the Consensus's interpretation may be the correct interpretation of the
provisions, and the courts addressing this issue under Art. I of the FAA are incorrect, but the courts
addressing the Expansion Issues do not make this observation, which further undermines their
analysis.
266. As will be discussed in more detail infra Parts IV.C-E, the majority of these courts
circumvent this prohibition in certain instances through their interpretation of Art. V(1)(e) of the NY
Convention.
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with the provisions in the NY Convention.267  This includes the vacatur
provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention. The term "conflict" is not
defined in the FAA or by any of the case law construing it, but in the context
of this statute it would most likely mean: (1) "to show antagonism or
irreconcilability: fail to be in agreement or accord;" or (2) "a: competitive or
opposing action of incompatibles: antagonistic state or action (as of
divergent ideas, interests, or persons) b: mental struggle resulting from
incompatible or opposing needs, drives, wishes, or external or internal
demands. 268
When these definitions are applied in the context of section 208 of Art.
2 of the FAA, it is clear that if there is a "conflict" between a provision in
the NY Convention and a provision in or implied under Ch. 1 of the FAA,
the provision in the NY Convention applies. However, courts have not
sufficiently addressed whether there is only a "conflict" when the NY
Convention is silent about a certain issue, but Ch. 1 of the FAA speaks to the
issue, or if a conflict only exists when a provision in the NY Convention and
a provision in Ch. 1 of the FAA resolve the same issue in a different fashion.
In other words, if a ground of review in the NY Convention says X and a
ground of review in Ch. I of the FAA or implied under it says Y, then X
would apply. On the other hand, however, if the NY Convention is silent on
a given issue and a ground of review in or implied under Ch. 1 of the FAA
says X, does X apply, or does the silence in the NY Convention govern?
269
267. See supra note 32.
268. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://mwl.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/conflict[1], http://mwl.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conflict[2] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2008).
269. Analogously, section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) delineates between
terms that are "different" and terms that are "additional" in the context of contracts for the sale of
goods. Specifically, section 2-207 concerns documents exchanged by contracting parties, which
cover the purchase and sale of goods, but do not contain the same terms. In other words, section 2-
207 applies to what is commonly referred to as the "battle of the forms." Terms that are "different"
are those that are discussed in the original document and the subsequent document, but are not the
same. For example, the original document says each widget costs $10, while a subsequent document
says each widget costs $12. On the other hand, terms that are "additional" are those that are
included in the subsequent document, but not in the initial document. For example, the initial
document does not include any warranties as to the quality of the goods involved, while the
subsequent document does include warranties. The U.C.C. has adopted specific rules to analyze
"different" and "additional" terms, in recognition of how the two concepts are not the same. Courts
construing the word "conflict" under the NY Convention, however, have not recognized this
significant difference between the two concepts.
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Accordingly, as a result of this distinction, courts have not sufficiently
addressed the meaning or the significance of the term "conflict" when
analyzing whether a District Court can apply grounds of review in or
implied under Art. 1 of the FAA to actions governed by the NY Convention.
Since courts do not pay attention to the definition of "conflict," their analysis
is incomplete.270
For example, if there is no conflict when the NY Convention is silent on
an issue-i.e. the NY Convention does not include the same grounds of
review as are in or implied under Art. 1 of the FAA-an argument can be
made that the grounds of review in sections 10 and 1 1 of Ch. 1 of the FAA,
or implied under it, can be relied upon as a result of this silence. If this is
the case, then those courts that undermine the Consensus by interpreting Art.
V(1)(e) of the NY Convention to mean that the grounds of review in Ch. 1
of the FAA and implied under them can apply to actions governed by the
NY Convention in certain situations is superfluous, as the grounds would
271apply anyway.
As such, the failure of courts to sufficiently address the actual meaning
of the term "conflict", will most likely lead courts to further misconstrue
whether parties can contract to expand the judicial review provisions in Art.
V of the NY Convention when faced with the issue.
C. The NY Convention's Vacatur Provisions Were Intended to be Narrowly
Construed
Various courts have circumvented the Consensus by construing Art.
V(1)(e) of the NY Convention to allow parties in certain instances-where
an award is rendered and confirmation is sought in the same jurisdiction-to
apply vacatur provisions outside of those enumerated in Art. V of the NY
Convention. 22 Courts reach this conclusion despite how an analogous
270. The Industrial Risk court implicitly concluded that if the NY Convention was silent on an
issue, a party could not apply a provision in "conflict" with the silence. Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at
1446. The court did not discuss the meaning of the term "conflict" or its relevance. However, it
seemed to rely on the use of the word "shall" in 9 U.S.C. section 207 as determinative, and requires
that only the vacatur provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention can be applied when a court reviews
an arbitration award governed by the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA. Id. However, this
interpretation of section 207 of Art. 2 of the FAA is arguably incorrect, as those courts addressing an
analogous section, section 9 of Art. I of the FAA, which includes the word "must" instead of
"shall", came to the exact opposite conclusion. For a more detailed discussion of these two
provisions see supra Part IV.A. In fact, all the circuit courts addressing the same argument under
section 9 of Art. I of the FAA have at least recognized manifest disregard of the law, a ground of
review not enumerated in sections 10 and II of Art. I of the FAA.
271. See infra Part IV.D for a more detailed discussion of Art. V(I)(e).
272. See supra note 9.
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argument has been entertained and rejected by all courts addressing it. The
analogous argument is that manifest disregard of the law-a ground of
review implied under Ch. I of the FAA 273-can be pigeonholed into the
public policy ground of review found in Art. V(2)(b) of the NY Convention.
This unanimous rejection demonstrates how Congress intended for the NY
Convention's grounds of review to be narrowly construed.274
Despite numerous courts concluding that the NY Convention's review
provisions were intended to be narrowly construed, the Second Circuit in
Yusuf,275 and its progeny, have still tried to pigeonhole the manifest
disregard of the law ground of review-and the other vacatur provisions
enumerated in, and implied under sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA-
into Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention. This attempt to circumvent the
inherently narrow nature of the NY Convention's vacatur provisions, like the
attempt to apply manifest disregard of the law through Art. V(2)(b)-the NY
Convention's public policy ground of review-should have been rejected.
However, irrespective of whether this group of courts improperly
construes Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention, the application of the grounds
of review in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA and those implied under
it in this fashion will not assist parties who wish to argue that they can
contract to expand the judicial review provisions found in Art. V of the NY
Convention. The grounds of review in sections 10 and 1 1 of Art. 1 of the
FAA and implied under it, are applied through one of the NY Convention's
specified vacatur provisions, Art. V(1)(e)-consistent with the
Consensus"6-not in addition to the vacatur provisions enumerated in Art.
V of the NY Convention.
D. The Operative/Material Language in Art. V(1)(e) of the NVY Convention is
in the Past Tense
Article V(1)(e) allows an arbitration award to be vacated when "[t]he
award has not yet become binding on the parties,277 or has been set aside or
273. See FAA §§ 10-11, supra note 10.
274. Karaha Bodas I, 364 F.3d at 288 ("Defenses to enforcement under the New York
Convention are construed narrowly, 'to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial
arbitration agreements in international contracts .......
275. See supra text accompanying notes 117-48.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 13-19.
277. The phrase "not yet become binding on the parties" is superfluous. Due to the use of the
word "or" before the phrase "has been set aside or suspended", the phrase "not yet become binding
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suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
law of which, that award was made."2 8
Courts attempting to pigeonhole the vacatur provisions from sections 10
and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA and the grounds of review implied under the
provisions, into Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention, fail to recognize how
the material/operative language in the statute- "has been set aside or
suspended "--is in the past tense. It must be noted that the aforementioned
quoted language modifies both the "by a competent authority of the country"
and the "under the law of which" language. The significance of this
language being in the past tense, is that any action a court takes pursuant to
this provision must be based on a past action taken by a previous competent
authority, or under the law of a competent authority. In other words, it acts
as both a condition precedent and a finality requirement.
Because all the relevant language in Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention
is in the past tense, this provision does not allow-as the Yusuf court, its
progeny, and certain commentators argue-a court to apply a signatory
state's domestic arbitration law to disputes where enforcement of an award
is sought in the same jurisdiction where it was rendered. Any interpretation
of this provision allowing domestic vacatur provisions to apply ignores how
domestic vacatur law is applied prior to the awards at issue being "set aside
or suspended by a competent authority.,
279
Significantly, the awards addressed by Yusuf and its progeny are in full
force and effect when this misguided interpretation of Art. V(1)(e) is
applied, as the awards were validly rendered by an arbitration panel and
addressed in the first instance by a reviewing U.S. federal court. Moreover,
if the drafters of the NY Convention intended for a signatory state's
domestic arbitral law to apply to a dispute governed by the NY Convention,
they would have specified that clearly in the text of the NY Convention.
Instead, courts have had to misconstrue the purpose of, and stretch the
meaning of, Art. V(l)(e), to allow vacatur provisions outside of Art. V of the
NY Convention to apply.
on the parties" must be treated as independent from the latter portions of Art. V(I)(e). The use of
the word "and" would have changed the meaning of the entire provision. Read literally in its current
form, the phrase "not yet become binding on the parties" would allow an award to be vacated solely
if it is not binding on the parties-no other showing would be required. All arbitration awards are
not binding until approved by a court. Accordingly, all the awards at issue before the courts
addressing the Expansion Issues are not initially binding on the parties. The effect of this provision
would be that an arbitration award could be vacated for any reason. This in turn undermines the
narrow nature of arbitral review, and could not have possibly been the intent of the drafters.
278. See supra note 9 (footnote added).
279. See Yusuf 126 F.3d at 20.
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Additionally, an interpretation that recognizes the significance of the
past tense is consistent with the legislative history behind the NY
Convention, case law interpreting the NY Convention, and commentator's
writings, all stressing the uniformity that the NY Convention was intended
to provide.2 80 Any semblance of uniformity is lost, and the non-domestic
party potentially prejudiced, when a court is allowed to apply vacatur
provisions unique to the jurisdiction of its choice.
E. Parties Will Not Be Allowed to Contract to Expand the Judicial Review
Provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention
Section 202 of the NY Convention reiterates and reinforces section 2 of
Ch. 1 of the FAA. Both provisions set forth one of the major policies
underlying both the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA and Art. 1 of the
FAA-that parties' contracts containing arbitration provisions must be
enforced according to their terms, like any other contract. Each provision
states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 28f
In addition to section 2 of Ch. 1 of the FAA, courts analyzing whether
parties can contract to expand the judicial review provisions in sections 10
and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA rely on Byrd,282 Volt, 2 83 and First Options,
284
among other Supreme Court precedents, in support of their respective
positions. When read together, these three decisions demonstrate that one
major purpose underlying Art. 1 of the FAA is to enforce parties'
agreements according to their terms, while another is the efficiency
arbitration as an institution compared to litigation is supposed to provide.285
280. See supra note 146.
281. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
282. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213.
283. Volt, 489 U.S. 468.
284. First Options, 514 U.S. 938.
285. The efficiency arbitration, as an institution, is supposed to provide distinguishes it from
litigation, and makes it a truly alternative form of dispute resolution.
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Courts allowing parties to contract to expand the judicial review
provisions in sections 10 and 1 1 of Art. 1 of the FAA, argue that treating
parties' contracts containing an arbitration clause the same as any other
contract trumps any other policy underlying Art. 1 of the FAA.286 On the
other hand, those courts concluding parties cannot contract to expand
judicial review under sections 10 and 11, note that enforcing parties
arbitration agreements according to their terms, like any other contracts,
does not trump, but must coexist with other policies underlying Art. 1 of the
FAA, especially the efficiency arbitration as an institution provides.
2 87
Only select cases addressing confirmation or vacatur proceedings under
the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA, or the Expansion Issues, address
Byrd, Volt or First Options.288 None of the cases relying on these three
decisions do so in the context of private agreements to expand judicial
review. However, it logically follows that since these cases are relied upon
to any extent by courts analyzing the NY Convention and Art. 2 of the FAA,
courts will rely upon them when they finally address whether parties can
contract to expand the judicial review provisions in Art. V of the NY
Convention. However, unlike in the context of Art. 1 of the FAA, any
argument in support of allowing parties to contract to expand the judicial
review provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention, must be weighed against
the Consensus on the Expansion Issues.
i. Volt
The court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University was faced with a situation where a
California state statute allowed a court to stay an arbitration pending
resolution of related litigation between a party to the arbitration agreement
and third parties not bound by it, where "there is a possibility of conflicting
rulings on a common issue of law or fact., 289  The provision in the
California state statute is not included in Art. 1 of the FAA.
The Supreme Court in Volt dictates, "[t]here is no federal policy
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy
286. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 3, 16-25.
287. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 3, 25-36.
288. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A., 403 F.3d at 91 (relying on Volt); Czarina, L.L.C.
v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1293-94 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (relying on First Options); China
Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 280-91 (recognizing that First Options has been applied in an international
context); Baker Marine, 191 F.3d at 197 (relying on Volt); Industrial Risk, 141 F.3d at 1450 (relying
on Volt); Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. v. ACI Int'l, 2005 WL 1118130 at * 7, *9
(relying on First Options); Jacada 1, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (relying on Volt).
289. Volt, 489 U.S. at 471.
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is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private
agreements to arbitrate. '90  Courts concentrate on certain language from
Volt when addressing whether contractual agreements to expand the judicial
review provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA are
enforceable. The relevant language begins as follows:
In recognition of Congress' principal purpose of ensuring that private arbitration
agreements are enforced according to their terms, we have held that the FAA pre-empts
state laws which "require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration" .. . (finding pre-empted a state
statute which rendered agreements to arbitrate certain franchise claims
unenforceable); ... (finding pre-empted a state statute which rendered unenforceable
private agreements to arbitrate certain wage collection claims).
2 91
The Supreme Court continued:
But it does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be
quite inimical to the FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will
arbitrate ... so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration
will be conducted. Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of
arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where
the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward. By permitting the courts to "rigorously
enforce" such agreements according to their terms.., we give effect to the contractual
rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies behind by the
FAA. 292
The Supreme Court's decision in Volt also includes certain
limiting/qualifying language, (some of which is included in the above quoted
passage), ignored by most courts addressing whether parties can contract to
expand the judicial review provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the
FAA.293 Due to the presence of this language, a compelling argument can
be made that courts will not uphold all contracts between parties relating to
arbitration agreements-despite the policy in section 2 of Ch. 1 of the
290. Id. at 469.
291. Id. at 478-79 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
292. Volt, 489 U.S at 479 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
293. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 11-13, 43-47.
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FAA-including all contracts to expand Art. 1 of the FAA's judicial review
provisions. 294
The limiting/qualifying language in Volt includes the Supreme Court's
pronouncement that the state rules parties wish to apply must not either
"undermine the goals and policies of the FAA' 295 or "[do] violence to the
policies behind the FAA., 2 96  Other limiting/qualifying language includes
the pronouncement that preemption only occurs when state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress., 297 A final potentially limiting/qualifying phrase is
the Supreme Court's declaration that "parties are generally free to structure
their arbitration agreements as they see fit.
291
It is not clear from Volt what limiting language the Supreme Court
wishes for the lower courts to apply to a given case. 299  There is no
indication that the Supreme Court intended for all the limiting language to
mean the same thing, and it does not °.30  This results in ambiguity,
confusion, and a difficulty predicting when parties' agreements to apply
state law in actions governed by Ch. 1 of the FAA will be preempted.0
While stressing the importance of enforcing parties' agreements
according to their terms-section 2 of Ch. 1 of the FAA-the Volt court
unquestionably determined Art. 1 of the FAA was not intended to
completely preempt state arbitration schemes.30 2 State arbitration rules
would apply if the parties intended for them to apply.
Courts addressing whether parties can contract to expand the judicial
review provisions enumerated in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA,
argue that Volt's premise concerning parties' intent also can be applied to
294. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
295. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 479 (emphasis added). See also, Milana Koptsiovsky, A Right To Contract For
Judicial Review of An Arbitration Award: Does Freedom of Contract Apply to Arbitration
Agreements?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 609 (2004) (construing the "doing violence" language in Volt as
applying to only one policy, "the Act's overriding purpose of ensuring that private arbitration
agreements are enforced according to their terms," and in light of Byrd outweighing speed,
efficiency and finality). But see, Ilya Enkishev, Above the Law: Practical and Philosophical
Implications of Contracting For Expanded Judicial Review, 3 J. AM. ARB. 61, 71 (2004)
(recognizing the phrase in Volt, "without doing violence to the policies behind.. the FAA [is] often
forgotten" and that "the policy and purpose behind the FAA is to 'reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements."').
297. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (emphasis
added).
298. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added).
299. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 11-13, 43-47.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.
108
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parties' agreements to expand Art. 1 of the FAA's judicial review
provisions. 33 Thus, if parties intend for more judicial review than provided
for in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA, then Art. III courts must
oblige and apply the parties agreed upon standards, subject to the
aforementioned limiting language.30 4
Due to parties' reliance on various aspects of Volt in the context of Art.
2 of the FAA and the NY Convention,3 °5 parties will also rely on Volt when
arguing that contracts to expand the judicial review provisions in Art. V of
the NY Convention should be enforced. 306 However, the qualifying/limiting
language in Volt, and the circuit split on whether parties can contract to
expand judicial review in an action governed by Art. I of the FAA, suggest
that not all parties' agreements would preempt Art. 1 of the FAA, despite the
contracting parties' intent.30 7
Arguably then, this qualifying/limiting language must also be applied to
parties' agreements to expand the vacatur provisions in Art. V of the NY
Convention. This language would work to counteract those arguments made
in support of contracts to expand the judicial review provisions in the NY
Convention, like it does under sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA.30 8
ii. Byrd and First Options
Various courts also rely on Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd30 9 and
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan3t 0 when analyzing whether parties
can contract to expand the judicial review provision in sections 10 and 11 of
Art. I of the FAA. Those courts note, that pursuant to Byrd and First
Options, the resolution of whether parties can contract to expand the judicial
review provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA, depends,
among other things, on the balance between two of the main purposes
303. See id.
304. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 11-13, 43-47.
305. See supra note 286.
306. These contracts under the NY Convention could include agreements to apply the vacatur
provisions, in and implied under sections 10 and 11 of Art. I of the FAA. If this is the case, courts
may potentially have to re-visit their resolution of the Expansion Issues.
307. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 11-13, 43-47.
308. See id.
309. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213.
310. First Options, 514 U.S. 938.
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underlying the FAA: (i) enforcing parties' agreements according to their
terms and (ii) maintaining arbitral efficiency.3 1'
1. Byrd
In Byrd, Lamar Byrd (Mr. Byrd) opened a securities account with Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. (Dean Witter).3 12 An arbitration clause in Mr. Byrd's
Customer Agreement stated "[a]ny controversy between you and the
undersigned arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration."'31 3 Mr. Byrd sued Dean Witter in federal
court and alleged violations of the federal securities laws and also certain
pendant state claims.31 4 Dean Witter argued that the district court should
order arbitration of the pendant state claims, but at the same time, stay
arbitration of those claims until the federal claims were litigated in federal
court. 3 5 Dean Witter assumed that the causes of action brought pursuant to
the federal securities laws had to be litigated in federal court and did not
request that they be arbitrated.31 6 The district court denied this request and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.31 7
The question presented to the Supreme Court in Byrd was "whether,
when a complaint raises both federal securities claims and pendent state
claims, a Federal District Court may deny a motion to compel arbitration of
the state-law claims, despite the parties' agreement to arbitrate their
disputes., 31 8 The Supreme Court held that "the Arbitration Act requires
district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of
the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be possibly
inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums. ' 31 9 In
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court found that the overriding goal
of the FAA was not to "promote the expeditious resolution of claims," but to
enforce arbitration agreements to the same extent as any other contracts,
according to their terms. 320 However, "[t]his is not to say that Congress was
311. Chafetz, supra note 24, at 11-13, 43-47.
312. Byrd, 470U.S. at214.
313. Id. at 215 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 11).
314. Id. at 214.
315. Id. at 215.
316. Id. at 215.
317. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215-216.
318. Id. at 214.
319. Id. at 217.
320. Id. at 219-220.
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blind to the potential benefit of the legislation for expedited resolution of
disputes." 321
The Supreme Court then compared two of Art. I of the FAA's main
purposes: (i) maintaining arbitral efficiency; and (ii) enforcing parties'
agreements according to their terms.
322
The court observed:
We therefore are not persuaded by the argument that the conflict between two goals of
the Arbitration Act--enforcement of private agreements and encouragement of efficient
and speedy dispute resolution-must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to realize
the intent of the drafters. The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that
we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is "'piecemeal" litigation,
at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute .... By
compelling arbitration of state-law claims, a district court successfully protects the
contractual rights of the parties and their rights under the Arbitration Act. 323
2. First Options
First Options concerned a dispute between First Options of Chicago,
Inc. (First Options), Manuel Kaplan (Mr. Kaplan) and Carol Kaplan (Manuel
Kaplan and Carol Kaplan are collectively referred to as the Kaplans) and Mr.
Kaplan's wholly owned investment company, MK Investments Inc.
(MKI).3 24  MKI and the Kaplans incurred substantial amounts of debt to
First Options after the 1987 Stock Market Crash.325 The Kaplans and MKI
entered into a four document "workout" agreement to alleviate the Kaplans'
debt load.326 Of the four documents, only the workout agreement signed by
MKI contained an arbitration clause.3 27  The Kaplans and MKI could not
satisfy all their debts to First Options, so First Options sought arbitration
against the Kaplans and MKI to protect its interests.328 Since only MKI
321. Id. at 220.
322. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
323. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
324. First Options, 514 U.S. at 940.
325. Id. at 940.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 941.
328. Id. at 940.
111
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signed the workout document containing the arbitration clause, the Kaplans
refused to arbitrate. 329
The Supreme Court in First Options granted certiori to resolve two
questions, only one of which is relevant to this article. The relevant question
was "[whether] the parties agree[d] to submit the arbitrability question...
itself to arbitration?, 330 The court determined that the terms of the parties'
agreement govern who decides whether the court or the arbitrator decides
the issue of arbitrability.
331
The Supreme Court addressed three counter-arguments made by First
Options against the proposition that an arbitrator or arbitration panel should
make an initial determination about the arbitrability of a dispute. 332  The
second and third counter-arguments are relevant to balancing the importance
of arbitral efficiency and enforcing parties' agreements according to their
terms. 3 3 The second counter-argument proposed by First Options was that
"permitting parties to argue arbitrability to an arbitrator without being bound
by the result would cause delay and waste in the resolution of disputes. 334
"The third counter-argument was 'that the Arbitration Act ... requires a
presumption that the Kaplans agreed to be bound by the arbitrators'
decision, not the contrary. '), 335
As to the second argument, the Supreme Court observed it was
inconclusive "for factual circumstances vary too greatly to permit a
confident conclusion about whether allowing the arbitrator to make an initial
(but independently reviewable) arbitrability determination would, in general,
slow down the dispute resolution process., 336  "In addressing the third
argument, the court found it to be legally erroneous and that 'there is no
strong arbitration-related policy favoring First Options in respect to its
particular argument here."'
337
The court then concluded that "the basic objective in this area is not to
resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties'
wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other
contracts, are enforced according to their terms, and according to the
intentions of the parties.
338
329. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
330. Id. at 943.
331. Id. at 943.
332. Id. at 946.
333. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 15-16, 54-57.
334. First Options, 514 U.S. at 946.
335. Chafetz, supra note 24, at 16 (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 946).
336. First Options, 514 U.S. at 946-947.
337. Chafetz, supra note 24, at 16 (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 947).
338. First Options, 514 U.S. at 947 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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F. Distinguishing Byrd and First Options From Cases Addressing
Contractual Expansion of the Vacatur Provisions in Sections 10 and 11
ofArt. 1 of the FAA and Art. V of the NY Convention
The issues considered in Byrd and First Options are clearly
distinguishable from the issue of parties contracting to expand the judicial
review provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA-which
numerous courts have addressed-and Art. V of the NY Convention.339
"First, based on the [issue] before the Byrd court.., the bifurcation of
proceedings-and the First Options court-the determination of who
decides arbitrability-the Supreme Court held the policy of enforcing
parties' agreements according to their terms trumps the efficient resolution
of disputes., 340 However, both Byrd and First Options dealt with situations
where ignoring the parties' intent would have potentially lead to the
underlying disputes not being arbitrated. 34' Here, in the context of expanded
judicial review, that is not the case, as the underlying dispute has already
been arbitrated and the issue before the court solely involves judicial review
of an arbitration award.
"In Byrd, the Supreme Court held that a court must grant a motion to
compel arbitration of pendant state law claims, even if the federal claims are
not arbitrable, and the ruling would result in the bifurcation of the
proceedings... In other words, a concurrent arbitration and litigation
between the same parties addressing different issues and causes of
action.' ' 342 Likewise, First Options addressed whether parties were allowed
to decide who should decide the issue of arbitrability, 343 or in other words,
who should decide which issues and causes of action are arbitrable. 344 The
decision of who decides arbitrability ultimately leads to a determination of
whether a dispute is or is not arbitrated.
"Second, if Byrd made a determinative statement about the balance
between maintaining arbitral efficiency and enforcing parties' agreements
according to their terms, First Options would have cited Byrd for that
proposition., 345 Although the First Options court did cite Byrd, it did not
339. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 15-16, 54-57.
340. Id. at 54-57.
341. See id.
342. Id. at 55.
343. See id. at 55 (emphasis added).
344. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 55.
345. Id. at 55.
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cite it for this purpose, even though it was called on to balance the two
policies.346 Thus, it is virtually impossible to argue Byrd's reasoning is
determinative on the balance between these two policies, being that First
Options did not rely on Byrd.
347
Third, the fact the appropriate balance is an open question, is
demonstrated by how the Supreme Court in First Options-the most recent
of its decisions balancing these two policies-does not decisively resolve the
issue.348 Those courts that rely on First Options and argue that maintaining
arbitral efficiency was not Congress's primary goal in promulgating Art. 1
of the FAA, only concentrate on the Supreme Court's response to First
Options' third argument, and fail to recognize the ambiguity introduced by
the Court's analysis of the second argument.349
As has been noted previously:
The Supreme Court's analysis of these two arguments is irreconcilable. As to the second,
the court implies that the "slow[ing] down of the dispute resolution process" is material if
"factual ... circumstances.., could permit a confident conclusion" the dispute
resolution process would be slowed down. In response to the third argument, the court
specifically states the FAA's underlying purpose was "not to resolve disputes in the
quickest manner possible," but to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,
like any other agreement. 
350
There is irrefutable evidence that the dispute resolution process is
slower and less efficient when parties contract to expand the judicial review
provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. 1 of the FAA."' Initially, this type
of review is often referred to as "expanded" or "supplemental" review. This
characterization alone demonstrates that the review process is slower and
less efficient.352 Second and more importantly, without expanded judicial
review, the confirmation of arbitration awards would be limited to the
restrictive judicial review provisions in sections 10 and 1 1 of Art. 1 of the
FAA, and other implied grounds of review, like manifest disregard of the
law.353 Courts are intimately familiar with all of these standards.
Since arbitral efficiency is markedly affected if parties' contracts to
expand Art. 1 of the FAA's judicial review provision are honored, this issue
is clearly distinguishable from the issue before the Supreme Court in First
346. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 55 (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 945).
347. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 55.
348. See id.
349. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 55; see supra Part IV.E.(ii)(2).
350. See id. at 55-56 (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 947).
351. See id. at 56.
352. See id.
353. See id.
114
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Options, which concluded that arbitral efficiency was not compromised.
3 54
Accordingly, the Supreme Court will balance the effect of enforcing parties'
contracts to expand judicial review on arbitral efficiency, with the
enforcement of parties' agreements according to their terms, and try to
reconcile First Options' resolution of argument two and argument three in
the context of parties contracting to expand the judicial review provisions in
sections 10 and 1 1 of Art. I of the FAA. 3Moreover, since courts addressing the NY Convention rely on First
Options in certain contexts, those same courts will also rely on First Options
when faced with parties' contracts to expand Art. V of the NY Convention's
judicial review provisions. Those courts would then arguably reconcile
arguments two and three in the same fashion-acknowledging the adverse
effects of enforcing parties' contracts to expand the judicial review
provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention on arbitral efficiency-as those
courts addressing whether parties can contract to expand judicial review
under sections 10 and 11 of Ch. I of the FAA.356
V. CONCLUSION
The majority of courts construing whether parties can contract to expand
the judicial review provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. I of the FAA,
among other sources, rely on section 2 of Art. 1 of the FAA, Volt, First
Options, and Byrd. Those courts conclude that enforcing parties'
agreements according to their terms is the most important policy underlying
Art. I of the FAA. 357 Despite acknowledging the importance of this policy,
the courts addressing whether parties can contract to expand the judicial
review provisions in sections 10 and 1 1 of Art. 1 of the FAA are split on the
issue.35 This split exists despite how all the federal courts addressing this
issue have concluded that grounds of vacatur outside of those enumerated in
354. See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 56-57.
355. See id. at 57.
356. See Encyclopaedia Universalis, 403 F.3d 85, 90 ("Given the strong public policy in favor
of international arbitration... review of arbitral awards under the New York Convention is 'very
limited in order.., to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes
efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation."' (quoting Yusuf 126 F.3d at 23)); see also
Chafetz, supra note 24, at 15-16, 54-57.
357. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
358. See id.
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sections 10 and 11 of Ch. 1 of the FAA,,35 9 including manifest disregard of
the law or certain other implied grounds of vacatur,,36 ° can be relied upon in
vacatur proceedings. 
361
On the other hand, not one court analyzing the Expansion Issues and the
vacatur provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention, has reached a conclusion
contrary to the Consensus,3 62 which mandates that parties cannot rely upon
any vacatur provisions outside of those enumerated in Art. V of the NY
Convention during a vacatur proceeding. Even those courts recognizing that
a signatory state's domestic vacatur provisions apply in certain instances, do
so only by applying them through Art. V(1)(e) of the NY Convention. In
other words, the provisions in Ch. 1 of the FAA and those implied under it
apply directly through a provision in Art. V of the NY Convention, not in an
implied fashion like how manifest disregard of the law and other non-
statutory grounds of review are applied under Art. I of the FAA.
When courts finally address whether parties can contract to expand Art.
V of the NY Convention's vacatur provisions, they to, like courts addressing
the issue under Art. 1 of the FAA, will rely upon section 202 of the FAA,3 6 3
Volt, Byrd, and First Options.3" Arguments relying on these precedents
under Art. 1 of the FAA have been met with a mixed reception, despite how
all courts addressing them have recognized implied grounds of review under
Ch. 1 of the FAA.3 65 These same arguments will be made when parties
attempt to contract to expand the judicial review provisions in Art. V of the
NY Convention. However, the arguments will be a lot less convincing as
the Consensus on the Expansion Issues is that only the grounds of review in
Art. V of the NY Convention can be relied upon when parties move to
vacate an arbitration award. Based on the resolution of the Expansion Issues
alone, the problems that parties contracting to expand the judicial review
provisions in sections 10 and 11 of Art. I of the FAA were faced with under
Art. 1 of the FAA, will be a greater impediment when courts finally address
whether parties can contract to expand judicial review under the NY
Convention.
All told, it is very unlikely that parties will be allowed to contract to
expand the judicial review provisions in Art. V of the NY Convention.
359. See9U.S.C.§§ 10-11.
360. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 25.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20 for a discussion of the Consensus.
363. As discussed in supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text, this section is identical to
section 2 of Art. I of the FAA.
364. See supra Parts IV.E.i-ii for a discussion of these three decisions.
365. See supra note 25.
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Although an argument can be made, it is not as strong as the argument that
can be made under Ch. 1 of the FAA, which so far only has resulted in a
pronounced circuit split.
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